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Abstract 
THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION STUDY: 
A SOCIOECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND CLOSURE TRANSITION GUIDE BOOK 
 
AUGUST 2015 
 
JONATHAN G. COOPER, B.A., ST. JOHN’S COLLEGE, ANNAPOLIS 
 
M.A., THE CONWAY SCHOOL 
 
M.R.P., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor John R. Mullin, Ph.D., FAICP 
 
Between February 2013 and December 2014, four communities hosting a nuclear power 
plant in the U.S. were faced with the sudden closure of the plant. These closures were 
largely attributable to market changes in the energy sector, driven by sustained growth in 
the natural gas industry. The rise of natural gas-fired plants has recently forced several of 
the nation’s older coal-fired and petroleum-based power plants into early retirement, and 
nuclear industry analysts suspect that the nuclear closures of the past two years may be 
just the beginning of a similar trend.  
Unfortunately, the extent of nuclear power plant closure impacts has rarely been 
investigated until after a plant’s closure is announced, and only at the broader multi-
county scale commonly found in economic analysis and forecasting. This project attempts 
to provide an improvement on both fronts: assessing an existing plant, with no plans to 
close, at local and regional scales. This project uses Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station as its 
subject of study. The plant, in Plymouth, Massachusetts, is licensed to operate until 2032.  
After contextualizing nuclear closure and nuclear decommissioning, the project 
inventories the plant’s key characteristics as a landowner and employer. It then identifies 
the plant’s current socioeconomic contributions, details its operational impacts on other 
segments of the local and regional economy, and estimates how the plant’s closure would 
affect the town and region. This project finds that the socioeconomic impacts of closure 
are so significant at local and regional levels that planning and economic development 
agencies cannot afford to wait until closure plans are announced to engage with the topic. 
I conclude with recommendations for the town and the region to build the knowledge, 
support, and momentum necessary to ensure the success of the long-term, multi-
stakeholder, and cooperative approach the plant’s eventual closure will require.  
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Summary of Impacts 
This Guide Book estimates the socioeconomic impacts of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power 
Station (“Pilgrim Station”) on the Town of Plymouth, the Old Colony Planning Council 
(OCPC), and neighboring cities and towns. The plant’s direct impacts are identified first, 
followed by estimates of secondary impacts that come from the business and household 
spending caused by Pilgrim Station’s expenditures. The Guide Book then estimates the 
impacts Pilgrim Station’s closure would have on Plymouth and broader economies. This 
section of the report presents the Guide Book’s major findings. 
Pilgrim Station in 2014 
Direct Impacts 
$440 Million Wholesale value of electricity produced 
586  Pilgrim Station workforce 
$77 Million Wages and benefits for plant workforce 
$60 Million Spending for goods and services in southeastern Massachusetts 
$17.4 Million State and local taxes and other payments 
$300K  Charitable giving by Entergy and Pilgrim Station 
Secondary Impacts 
$105 Million Additional economic output attributable to Pilgrim Station 
589  Additional jobs created by Pilgrim Station  
$30 Million Wages and benefits paid by additional jobs 
Town of Plymouth Impacts 
190  Pilgrim Station employees living in Plymouth 
$24.9 Million Wages and benefits paid to plant employees 
$58.5 Million Value of real estate owned by plant employees 
$10.3 Million Municipal revenue from Pilgrim Station 
$950K  Municipal revenue from employee property tax payments 
$23K - $61K Municipal revenue from biennial refueling outages   
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Significant Findings 
Pilgrim Station is a vital part of a regional economy that lags behind the state 
in key indicators of economic performance. 
Pilgrim Station’s most significant direct impact is the hundreds of well-compensated jobs 
it provides.  
As of February 2015 there were 586 employees at Pilgrim Station, with a payroll of 
approximately $55 million and a weekly wage of $1,805. This represents 2.5% of the jobs 
held in Plymouth, and 5.3% of the wages paid in Plymouth. The average weekly wage at 
Pilgrim Station is 50 percent higher than the state average, and more than double the 
average wages in Plymouth, the OCPC, and Barnstable County. These jobs also provide 
considerable fringe benefits not included in the payroll total, likely raising the overall 
compensation value by 40 percent, to approximately $77 million. 
Much of the Pilgrim Station workforce lives in the towns closest to the plant, which keeps 
much of the earned income within southeastern Massachusetts. 
Nearly 85 percent of employees live in either Plymouth or Barnstable counties. By a wide 
margin, Plymouth is the most common place of residence, with 190 employees. Only five 
other towns are home to as many as 20 employees: Sandwich, Carver, Kingston, Bourne, 
and Marshfield. As a result, $17.8 million in Pilgrim Station wages is earned by Plymouth 
residents, and $7.2 million by other residents of the OCPC, $10.7 million by residents in 
SRPEDD towns, and $10.2 million by residents of the Cape. Adjusted to include benefits, 
Plymouth’s total value approaches $25 million. 
Pilgrim Station’s non-payroll expenditures were approximately $77.5 million, and 
provided a substantial source of revenue to local businesses and municipalities. 
More than 25 percent of Plymouth County businesses are in one of six industry subsectors 
that meet the procurement needs of nuclear power plants, likely accounting for the bulk 
of the estimated $60 million in procurement spending throughout Plymouth and 
Barnstable counties. Along with this spending, Pilgrim Station made more than $17 
million in state and municipal payments for taxes and emergency preparedness funding. 
Approximately $10 million was paid to the Town of Plymouth alone, representing over 7 
percent of the Town’s total levy of $138.4 million for Fiscal Year 2015. 
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Pilgrim Station’s direct impacts generate substantial secondary impacts 
throughout the region. 
Pilgrim Station’s operation stimulates additional economic activity in Plymouth and 
Barnstable counties. 
The in-region spending by both Pilgrim Station vendors and plant employees creates an 
additional $105 million in regional economic output. Much like Pilgrim Station’s direct 
economic output of $440 million supports 586 jobs with labor income of $77 million, the 
plant’s secondary economic output of $105 million supports 590 jobs in the two counties, 
with earnings of nearly $30 million.  
Spending by Pilgrim Station employees makes a significant impact on industries outside 
the nuclear power plant supply chain. 
Nuclear power plant employees enjoy relatively high wages and comprehensive health care 
packages. As a result, hospitals and other health practitioners’ offices in the region benefit 
significantly from the Pilgrim Station workforce. Household spending is also 
disproportionately high at real estate establishments, restaurants, and financial 
institutions. 
Nuclear power plant employment is stable and well-compensated, enabling employees 
to attain home ownership. 
Based on current median home values, the property owned by Pilgrim Station employees 
living in these ten towns is over $135 million, with $58.5 million in Plymouth alone. The 
residential property taxes generated by this group reach $1.95 million annually, with 
$908,000 collected by Plymouth. This is augmented by motor vehicle excise tax payments, 
which are estimated to reach $45,000 per year in Plymouth, based on the substantial 
number of employees living there.  
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Part One: Introduction 
1.1 Project Background and Goal 
On June 18, 2014, Moody’s Investors Service released a report entitled, “US Nuclear and 
Coal-Fired Power Plant Retirements to Jolt Some Local Governments.” The purpose of the 
report was to identify the ten local governments across the country with the highest levels 
of credit exposure in the event of a power plant closure or downsizing. One of the 
municipalities identified was the Town of Plymouth, Massachusetts, where the General 
Obligation Bond rating is Aa2 (high quality and very low credit risk), and where the 
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim Station) has operated since 1972. While Pilgrim 
Station is licensed to operate until 2032, and there have been no indications or discussions 
suggesting that the plant will close before that time, the report raised a series of 
challenging questions. What will happen when the plant closes? Will the municipal 
impacts be limited to bond ratings? What other aspects of life in Plymouth are affected by 
the operation of Pilgrim Station, and would therefore be affected by its closure? Is nuclear 
power plant closure at all different form other types of plant closure? 
These are the questions this project attempts to address. Surprisingly, they have rarely 
been asked in any nuclear host community. A number of industry-sponsored economic 
impact analyses for nuclear power plants exist, but they focus on national, state, and multi-
county level impacts, leaving closure questions and local-scale questions aside. The goal 
of this project, then, is to create a Guide Book specific to Plymouth and its region that 
identifies the critical socioeconomic issues related to nuclear power plant closure, 
quantifies local-level direct and indirect impacts, pinpoints possible strategies to address 
the challenges of closure, and clarifies the roles for local and regional planning agencies in 
the closure process. 
1.2 Issues and Context 
A nuclear power plant is a remarkable entity. Its reactor generates much more than 
electricity, and produces much more than spent fuel and steam: the plant also creates jobs, 
business and household spending, municipal revenue, charitable donations, and 
seemingly endless public conflict and concern. It is one of the biggest cogs in its local 
economic engine, but it mostly operates out of view. It is built to withstand massive 
stresses, but with a current maximum lifespan of sixty years, it is not built to last. It is a 
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major source of local employment, but it is not a major source of local identity: America 
has steel towns, lumber towns, coal towns, college towns, resort towns, military towns, 
and many more. But it doesn’t have nuclear towns.  
This is partly explained by an unusual dynamic in many communities that host or have 
hosted a nuclear power plant: considerable reliance on the plant’s local and regional 
socioeconomic benefits, combined with relatively limited public awareness of that role. In 
many instances, it is only when the plant owners announce closure plans that much 
consideration is given to the local and regional impacts of nuclear power plant closure. As 
the full extent of the plant’s local socioeconomic footprint comes into view, a host 
community realizes that the closure can lead to much more than a loss in tax revenue and 
electrical generation capacity. Unfortunately, the narrative that accompanies nuclear 
plant closure at higher levels of government does not take this footprint into consideration. 
From a regulatory perspective, a nuclear power plant in the United States closes 
permanently when its nuclear reactor(s) enter the decommissioning phase. The final step 
in that phase is the release of all property from the regulatory oversight of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). For the plant’s owners, employees, contractors, 
ratepayers, investors, and regulators, it is the end of a long, expensive, and labor-intensive 
process. For those communities and regions hosting a nuclear reactor, however, the 
narrative continues after the decommissioning phase draws to a close.  
From a local perspective, decommissioning is only one part of the “post-operational” 
phase, in which a community is forced to confront the socioeconomic impacts of plant 
closure. Although the regional socioeconomic impacts of a nuclear power plant’s 
construction and operation have been studied extensively, far less attention has been paid 
to the local impacts of plant operation, and nearly none has been given to the regional or 
local impacts of plant closure. Furthermore, although the NRC has a thorough and 
complex process for ensuring that nuclear decommissioning is safely and successfully 
carried out, there is no system in place for assisting host communities and regions with 
the socioeconomic impacts of power plant closure. In short, nuclear power plant closure 
is a well-understood engineering and logistical event, but a poorly understood economic 
and social event. 
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Compared with other responses to local economic destabilization, this is a significant gap. 
In the last half of the 20th century, the federal government often assisted communities 
affected by military, industrial, and environmental issues. In 1961, the Office of Economic 
Adjustment was created within the Department of Defense. Its purpose was to assist 
communities adversely affected by base closures or other program changes, and it has 
remained the key federal contributor to local entities throughout the Base Realignment 
and Closure (BRAC) process. In the 1970s, as the deindustrialization of the United States 
became the subject of intense academic and professional study, major federal and state 
initiatives were established to both prevent the loss of jobs and productivity, and to create 
social safety nets where facilities had closed. Lastly, in 1980, Congress passed the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) to 
confront the legacy of our industrial past and its presence in many downtowns and 
waterfronts, creating the Superfund program that is key to site reuse today. 
However, without an established program bringing local, state, and federal officials 
together with plant ownership to focus on post-closure outcomes for nuclear host 
communities, local and regional entities wishing to begin the process before plant closure 
is at hand must do so alone. Unfortunately, the mutually antagonistic relationship between 
the nuclear power industry and the well-organized anti-nuclear movement can make plant 
operators wary of sharing much information with local officials. Adding to the complexity 
is the sudden nature of nuclear power plant closure: while the NRC licensing process 
currently allows reactors to operate for up to 60 years, not once has a plant’s closure 
coincided with the expiration of its license. Instead, the decisions are the results of energy 
competition, site maintenance regulations, plant materials, political action, and 
government regulation. In 1991, for example, upgrades to the NRC’s standards for plant 
operations led to the decision to close the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Plant in Rowe, 
Massachusetts the following year, even though the plant had more than eight years left on 
its original operating license. In 2013, Kewaunee Power Station in Kewaunee, Wisconsin 
was closed due to the falling prices of natural gas, despite having received a twenty-year 
license extension just five years before. 
As a result, host communities are left to their own devices following a closure 
announcement, largely watching from the sidelines as the plant’s productive era winds 
down and decommissioning begins. High-paying jobs leave the region, municipal revenue 
drops, and a major economic engine for direct, indirect, and induced impacts grinds to a 
halt. It falls to local and regional authorities to make the next move, with a considerable 
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degree of difficulty: a good deal of the plant’s reusable infrastructure is removed during 
decommissioning; land that has been decontaminated is still “former nuclear land” in the 
eyes of the public and the marketplace; and a portion of the site often contains storage 
facilities for spent nuclear fuel, to remain for an indeterminate period of time. This is a 
situation that calls for emergency economic and community development triage; instead, 
the prescription is “patient, heal thyself.” Whether local and regional planning and 
economic development officials have the professional expertise to do so is simply left to 
chance. 
This arrangement can have serious consequences. In August 1995, the Town of Haddam 
was in the middle of a property assessment dispute with the owner of the Connecticut 
Yankee nuclear power plant. At the time, the plant was expected to operate until its license 
expired in 2007. The plant was the town’s largest employer and taxpayer, and accounted 
for 59 percent of the town’s grand list. When asked by a local newspaper about recent 
efforts to expand the local tax base, such as the addition of a new sandwich shop and video 
store, a town selectman said, “we probably won’t get serious about any economic 
development until we’ve lost the income from [Connecticut Yankee].” It shut down just 15 
months later, in December 1996. 
On June 18, 2014, Moody’s Investors Service released a report entitled, “US Nuclear and 
Coal-Fired Power Plant Retirements to Jolt Some Local Governments.” The purpose of the 
report was to identify the ten local governments with the highest levels of credit exposure 
in the event of a power plant closure or downsizing. One of the municipalities identified 
was the Town of Plymouth, Massachusetts, where the General Obligation Bond rating is 
Aa2 (high quality and very low credit risk), and where the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 
(Pilgrim Station) has operated since 1972. While Pilgrim Station is licensed to operate 
until 2032, and there have been no indications or discussions suggesting that the plant 
will close before that time, the report raised a series of challenging questions. What will 
happen when the plant closes? Will the municipal impacts be limited to bond ratings? 
What other aspects of life in Plymouth are affected by the operation of Pilgrim Station, 
and would therefore be affected by its closure? Is nuclear power plant closure at all 
different form other types of plant closure? 
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Part Two: Closure and Decommissioning 
Contents and Summary 
Part Two describes the broader issues of nuclear power plant closure and nuclear power 
plant decommissioning in three sections. Section One identifies the characteristics of 
nuclear power plant closure that distinguish it from other plant closures in the energy and 
manufacturing sectors. Section Two explores the industry challenges that have 
contributed to the decisions to close four nuclear plants since 2013. Section Three 
describes the process of reactor decommissioning, and addresses the similarities and 
differences between the two options most common for commercial reactor 
decommissioning: immediate dismantlement (DECON), and deferred dismantlement 
(SAFSTOR). 
In summary, nuclear power plant closure and decommissioning present challenges that 
are not easily countered by existing best practices regarding facility closures. In addition 
to location and workforce particularities, there is no federal entity with an industry-
specific mandate to help communities facing nuclear power plant closure. Due to an 
unfortunate lapse in federal policy regarding spent fuel storage, spent fuel is currently 
stored on site indefinitely, resulting in widespread public and industry frustration with 
regulatory authorities. This impasse has contributed to the recent trend in 
decommissionings, in which plants owned by private companies have expressed a clear 
preference for allowing a site to sit unused for decades while radiation decays naturally 
before undertaking the bulk of the active dismantlement.  
2.1 Nuclear Power Plant Closure 
From some perspectives, nuclear power plant closure presents the same challenges as any 
other kind of major closure: jobs lost, workers dislocated, property values reduced, and 
industrial parcels vacated. However, a closer look at the characteristics of nuclear power 
plant closure reveals a typology distinct from both manufacturing and non-nuclear power 
plant closures. 
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LOCATION 
By design, nuclear power plants are out of the way. 
In the interests of caution and risk management, 
they are distant from valuable infrastructural 
assets like highway on-ramps, active commercial 
hubs, and adjacent industrial areas. For decades 
now, such elements have been essential traits of 
successful industrial land use development: most 
industrial operations depend on a steady stream of 
raw materials provided via just-in-time delivery, 
and co-locating with similar enterprises can help 
firms share costs and reduce costs for external 
services. Figure 2.1, taken from a 2012 land use 
study in Plymouth, identifies commercial and 
industrial zones in the town. Most parcels have 
direct highway or airport access. Pilgrim Station 
sits apart, miles from both. 
WORKFORCE 
With respect to the energy industry, nuclear power plant workforces are exceptionally 
large, and highly specialized. The average power plant employs fewer than 70 people, far 
below the nuclear power plant average of 950. In fact, for every 1,000 megawatts (MW) of 
capacity, a nuclear plant provides an average of 500 jobs, well in excess of other sources, 
such as coal (190 jobs); hydropower (120 jobs); wind (90 jobs); and natural gas (60 jobs). 
The specialized nature of nuclear energy employment also means that instead of 
developing new skills to find alternative employment in the region, many of these well-
compensated workers (and their families) will look to relocate to other nuclear plants in 
the event of a closure. See Section 3.2 for more information on workforce characteristics. 
CLEANUP 
Unlike other industrial closure cleanups, in which some existing structures and 
components can remain intact for future use, nuclear decommissioning requires the 
dismantling of nearly all structures on site. It can take anywhere from five years to five 
decades, and cannot begin until the plant owner has enough money to pay for the entire 
project. In most cases, this means reaching the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 
acceptable maximum radiation dose of 25 millirem per year from the decommissioned site 
FIGURE 2. 1: COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL ZONING  
 
Source: Town of Plymouth 
PILGRIM 
STATION 
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(slightly less than half of the radiation received from a single abdominal x-ray). In 
Massachusetts, however, where the cleanup standard is an appreciably more restrictive 10 
millirem per year, project costs would likely be higher from the outset. See Appendix A 
for more information on cleanup standards. 
ASSISTANCE 
The NRC is tasked solely with ensuring operator adherence to federal regulations 
regarding the safe construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning of nuclear 
reactors. There is no federal agency tasked with directly or indirectly assisting 
communities confronting nuclear plant closure. Unlike communities facing a military base 
closure, natural disaster, or manufacturing relocation, nuclear host communities are often 
left on their own. Without federal guidance, it is difficult for host communities and plant 
operators to determine expected impacts, appropriate preparations, and mutually 
beneficial outcomes. Some states have responded by entering into negotiations with plant 
operators that have announced closures, but with mixed results. 
SPENT FUEL 
There is no analogue in any other 
industry to the problem of storing 
spent nuclear fuel and other high-
level radioactive waste on-site 
indefinitely. Every regulation, 
investment, and development made 
in nuclear energy since the dawn of 
commercial reactor era has been 
based upon the presumption that the 
federal government would meet its 
obligations to provide a site for the 
permanent storage of high-level 
radioactive waste and spent fuel. It has not done so. Plant operators and host communities 
are now faced with the likelihood that spent nuclear fuel will remain stored and monitored 
on-site for decades, as has been the case at most of the decommissioned nuclear power 
plants around the country. With no resolution to this issue in the offing, a number of 
lawsuits have been filed in state and federal courts (see Appendix B). This holding 
pattern creates significant friction between the public and the plant operators, erodes the 
FIGURE 2. 2: SPENT FUEL STORAGE, CONNECTICUT YANKEE 
Source: Connecticut Yankee 
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trust of all parties in the federal agencies involved, and leaves a mark upon the land that 
prospective investors find difficult to ignore.  
As a result, current trends in economic revitalization, site reuse, and workforce 
development can have a hard time finding a best-practices foothold in mitigating the 
socioeconomic impacts of nuclear closure. In many other cases, grant applications can be 
written, facilities can be repurposed, workforces can be retrained, restoration can be 
accelerated, and funding can be obtained. A closed nuclear power plant is not so easily 
redeveloped, and the still-vacant parcels of land at former nuclear power plant sites in 
New England and beyond are a testament to this. Below, Table 2.1 identifies the current 
status of the nine plants to have been permanently shut down between 1989 and 1998, as 
well as the years the plants shut down, and cleanup was completed (not including spent 
fuel storage). The early experience at Fort St. Vrain, in which a site was decommissioned 
completely and back to generating revenue as a gas plant in less than a decade, has proven 
to be the exception and not the rule. See Appendix C for two case studies. 
Table 2.1: Current Site Status of Nuclear Plant Closures, 1989-1998 
 Closure Cleanup Major Site Reuse Initiatives 
Shoreham (NY) 1989 1994 None 
Fort St. Vrain (CO) 1989 1993 Gas plant, operational since 1996 
Rancho Seco (CA) 1989 2009 Gas plant, operational since 2006 
Yankee Rowe (MA) 1991 2007 None 
Trojan (OR) 1992 2006 None 
Connecticut Yankee 1996 2004 None: gas plant proposal failed in 2002 
Maine Yankee 1997 2005 None: coal plant proposal failed in 2007 
Big Rock Point (MI) 1997 2006 None 
Zion (IL) 1998 Ongoing None, cleanup in progress 
Source: Author’s review 
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2.2 Nuclear Industry Challenges 
There are two significant issues facing the US nuclear power industry: increasing plant 
costs and diminishing reactor lifespans. Their influence can be seen in the recent and 
upcoming plant closures that are indicative of the difficult position the US nuclear industry 
is in. Three nuclear power plants were permanently shut down in 2013: Kewaunee, in 
Wisconsin; San Onofre, in California, and Crystal River, in Florida. A fourth, Vermont 
Yankee, was closed in 2014, and officials at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station in 
New Jersey have announced their intention to close that plant in 2019. These pressures 
are felt most acutely at the 29 nuclear power plants operating in deregulated energy 
markets, as Pilgrim Station is. Referred to as “merchant” plants, these plants compete with 
other energy generating facilities to sell power to utility companies through a series of 
short-term contracts. While plants in regulated markets are facing the same challenges, 
the structure of the marketplace provides some insulation against the market adjustments 
described below. 
Plant Costs 
There are three main categories for plant operating costs: fuel costs, operation and 
maintenance (O&M) costs, and capital costs. Fuel costs account for the procurement of 
enriched nuclear fuel, as well as the reactor refueling process which shuts down the reactor 
every 18-24 months for approximately five weeks while spent fuel is removed and new fuel 
is loaded in. O&M costs account for ordinary expenditures, such as payroll, regulatory fees, 
taxes, routine equipment maintenance, and contributions to reactor decommissioning 
funds. Fuel costs and O&M costs refer to ongoing costs, and are often referred to as 
“production costs.” The third category, capital costs, refer to major investment 
expenditures. At existing nuclear power plants, capital costs account for the acquisition of 
land, the construction of new facilities, upgrades to mechanical and electrical systems, and 
safety retrofitting. In the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster in 2011, the NRC has 
required plant owners to make significant investments in system safety and security to 
maintain their operating licenses. At Pilgrim Station, this meant responding to elevated 
standards for containment vents, spent fuel pool instrumentation, and mitigation 
strategies in case of a loss of power at the plant. These plans were submitted in 2013 and 
2014, and have been subject to continued oversight and implementation since. In addition, 
the NRC requested reevaluations of the plant’s emergency communications systems, 
staffing levels, and resistance to earthquakes and flooding. Pilgrim Station was one of ten 
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nuclear power plants identified by the NRC as a high priority facility for seismic 
reevaluation, and the plant’s report was filed with the NRC in March 2014. Pilgrim Station 
was also one of twenty plants given three years to complete its flooding reevaluation, due 
to the substantial complexity of the site’s characteristics. This report was due on March 12, 
2015, and will likely be under NRC review for the next year. 
Advocates of nuclear power have long touted its low production costs relative to the fossil-
fueled plants which account for 67 percent of the nation’s electricity generation. (Among 
the energy sources that make up the remaining 33 percent, nuclear power is by far the 
largest, with 19 percent of the national total.) This advantage has always been tied to 
nuclear energy’s extremely low fuels costs. Unfortunately for these advocates, the 
production cost difference is nowhere near as strong as it was in recent years, as the 
sudden surge in domestic shale gas production has shifted the math considerably. 
Comparing 2008 and 2012 values of average fuel costs (in mills per kilowatt hour) for 
major U.S. investor-owned plants, the magnitude of the change becomes clear. At gas 
turbine plants, fuel costs fell drastically from 64.23 to 30.45; at fossil-fueled steam plants, 
costs fell moderately from 28.43 to 24.17; and at nuclear plants, costs rose moderately 
from 5.29 to 7.08. 
The increase in fuel costs would be less stressful for the nuclear industry if the markedly 
low fuel prices weren’t offset by the industry’s comparatively high O&M costs. According 
to industry analysts, O&M expenditures have increased in recent years in response to 
enhanced regulatory policies, elevated labor costs, and more intensive maintenance for 
older reactors (see below). Following the fuel costs comparison above, comparing changes 
to average O&M costs between 2008 and 2012 illustrates the effects. At gas turbine plants, 
O&M costs fell moderately from 6.49 to 5.22; at fossil-fueled steam plants, O&M costs rose 
slightly from 7.31 to 7.72; and at nuclear plants, costs rose moderately from 16.09 to 18.4.  
As Table 2.2 shows on the following page, the production costs (fuel costs plus O&M 
costs) were much more favorable to nuclear energy in 2008 than they were in 2012, as 
plummeting fuel prices for gas turbines changed the landscape significantly. However, a 
number of factors prevent nuclear power plants from streamlining operations to remain 
competitive. Given the complexity of nuclear power generation and the regulatory 
requirements to manage its risks, the industry is not in a position to cut costs, trim 
workforces, or postpone maintenance to a significant extent.  
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Table 2.2: Changes in Production Costs by Energy Industry, 2008 and 2012 
 Fuel Costs O&M Costs TOTAL COSTS 
 2008 2012 Change 2008 2012 Change 2008 2012 Change 
Gas Turbines 64.23 30.45 -52.6% 6.49 5.22 -19.6% 70.72 35.67 -49.6% 
Fossil Fuel Steam 28.43 24.17 -15.0% 7.31 7.72 5.6% 35.74 31.89 -10.8% 
Nuclear 5.29 7.08 33.8% 16.09 18.4 14.4% 21.38 25.48 19.2% 
Source: US EIA Electric Power Annual 2012, Table 8.4 
Reactor Lifespan 
Unlike the facilities of other energy industry sectors, nuclear power reactors have an 
established upper limit to their lifespan. According to NRC guidelines, a reactor may 
operate for no more than 60 years. With no new reactors built since 1996, analysts have 
been paying close attention to the impacts that approaching mandatory reactor retirement 
has on operational decisions. A firm end date means that each passing year represents one 
fewer year for ownership to earn a return on any investments. Fourteen reactors reached 
40 years of operation in 2014, bringing to 37 the total number of reactors with fewer than 
20 years left to operate. Eleven of these are at single-reactor plants, Pilgrim Station 
included, which will have to shut down entirely. 
The decision to close Oyster Creek in 2019 illustrates the reasoning behind the early 
retirement. The nation’s oldest operating nuclear reactor, the original license for Oyster 
Creek’s single reactor was set to expire in 2009. In the course of obtaining its 20-year 
extension, state officials pushed the plant’s owners, Exelon, to build cooling towers that 
would lower the temperature of the water leaving the plant. To avoid incurring the cost of 
a major project that did not extend the life or the productivity of the plant, Exelon agreed 
to forgo the final ten years of the license extension. In exchange, the state agreed to allow 
the plant to operate until 2019 without the cooling towers. 
2.3 Nuclear Decommissioning 
When a reactor is removed from service permanently, it enters the costly and time-
consuming process of decommissioning. The process calls for the return of the site to a 
neutral radiological state within 60 years of closure. Upon completion, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission releases the site from regulatory control. It is important to note 
that this process does not address the presence of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage 
Installation (ISFSI), which plant owners have been required to build in order to store used 
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nuclear fuel until the federal government secures an appropriate permanent repository. 
These are considered stand-alone facilities, which have their own NRC-issued licenses and 
must be maintained by plant owners according to NRC regulations. 
Regulatory Framework 
The NRC identifies three phases for nuclear power plant decommissioning: initial 
activities, major decommissioning and storage activities, and license termination 
activities. Although the NRC mandates at least two public meetings (conceivably more 
than fifty years apart), at no point in the NRC’s process is a plant owner required to 
determine, plan for, or mitigate the local socioeconomic impacts of the decommissioning. 
INITIAL ACTIVITIES 
This phase includes a series of filings and reports certifying the cessation of operations, 
the removal of nuclear fuel from the reactor, and the Post-Shutdown Decommissioning 
Activities Report (PSDAR). The PSDAR, which must be filed within two years of the 
shutdown, details the decommissioning approach selected, as well as a site-specific cost 
estimate and timeline. The NRC mandates one (1) public meeting sometime after the 
PSDAR is submitted to the NRC. 
MAJOR ACTIVITIES 
This phase describes the bulk of the decommissioning operations, such as removing major 
structural components. There are three approaches to large-scale commercial reactor 
decommissioning: 
DECON (immediate dismantling), which begins demolition and decontamination 
shortly after closure. DECON often takes 5-10 years. 
SAFSTOR (deferred dismantling), which allows radioactivity to decay before 
major activities commence. SAFSTOR often takes 50-55 years. 
A combination of DECON and SAFSTOR, based on site-specific arrangements. 
A fourth option, ENTOMB, encases the site’s radioactive components in concrete to decay 
naturally. It is a viable option for small test reactors with relatively brief operational lives, 
but is not suited to decommissioning a large-scale nuclear power plant. 
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LICENSE TERMINATION ACTIVITIES 
This phase includes the submission of a License Termination Plan (LTP) by the plant’s 
owner to the NRC. This report includes details for any remaining dismantlement or site 
remediation activities, and must be filed within two years of the expected release of the 
site from NRC oversight. The NRC mandates one (1) public meeting when the NRC 
receives the LTP. After implementing the LTP, the owner submits a Final Status Survey 
Report (FSSR) requesting that the operating license either be terminated (if spent fuel is 
not stored on-site) or reduced to the size of the spent fuel storage installation. 
If the FSSR is approved, the NRC agrees that the site is suitable for release from regulatory 
oversight. The goal is often Unrestricted Use, the NRC’s version of a greenfield. Since 
2000, however, the NRC has reviewed and approved requests for the partial release of a 
reactor site for unrestricted use prior to LTP approval. In 2003 for example, 431 acres of 
Maine Yankee’s “buffer” land was transferred to a developer for the purposes of 
constructing an industrial park two years before the facility was decommissioned (see 
Appendix C). 
Comparing SAFSTOR and DECON 
In order to determine the best decommissioning option for a given reactor, owners review 
a number of factors. Some of these are characteristic of the methods themselves, while 
others are specific to a given plant’s context. On the following page, Table 2.3 identifies 
several.  
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Table 2.3: Factors Affecting Decommissioning Strategies 
 DECON – Immediate Dismantling  SAFSTOR – Deferred Dismantling  
Technical Removes radioactive waste hazards to 
community 
Radioactive decay reduces hazards to 
workers 
 Takes advantage of existing best 
management practices 
Allows for advances in 
decommissioning technology 
 Must account for transportation of 
hazardous materials 
Must account for the long-term 
presence of hazardous materials 
Economic Significant up-front costs can be 
discounted over long term 
Project cost and complexity lowered 
as radioactivity decays 
 Avoids uncertainty of future market 
conditions, inflation, and potential 
natural disasters 
Allows decommissioning fund to grow 
substantially between closure and 
dismantling 
Social Allows for site reuse without 
stagnation 
Allows more infrastructure to remain 
after cleanup 
 Site remains active in immediate 
aftermath of closure, transmitting 
active-use benefits to the region 
Avoids public opposition associated 
with transportation for off-site disposal 
Ownership Public utilities can spread costs among 
ratepayers over the long term 
Investor-owned utilities can secure 
shareholder confidence by deferring 
costs 
Source: Adapted from Pasqualetti (1990) 
Since 1989, thirteen commercial nuclear power plants have shut down. On the following 
page, Table 2.4 arranges these plants by year of closure, and identifies the 
decommissioning method as well as the status of the project. As the table shows, the 
preference for decommissioning where plant shutdown is concerned has shifted 
completely to SAFSTOR in recent years. (In the case of a multi-reactor power plant 
decommissioning only one reactor while others remain operational, it is very common to 
put the reactor into SAFSTOR mode.) 
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Table 2.4: Decommissioning Methods and Status at Closed Facilities 
Name Location Closure Method Status Notes 
Shoreham East Shoreham, NY 1989 DECON 1994 Never Operational 
Fort St. Vrain Platteville, CO 1989 DECON 1993 ISFSI and Gas Plant 
Rancho Seco Herald, CA 1989 DECON 2009 ISFSI and Gas Plant 
Yankee Rowe Rowe, MA 1991 DECON 2007 ISFSI Only 
Trojan Rainier, OR 1992 DECON 2006 ISFSI Only 
Connecticut Yankee Haddam, CT 1996 DECON 2004 ISFSI Only 
Maine Yankee Wiscasset, ME 1997 DECON 2005 ISFSI Only 
Big Rock Point Hayes Township, MI 1997 DECON 2006 ISFSI Only 
Zion Zion, IL 1998 Mixed Ongoing Delayed DECON 
Crystal River 3 Crystal River, FL 2013 SAFSTOR Ongoing ISFSI 
Kewaunee Carlton, WI 2013 SAFSTOR Ongoing ISFSI 
San Onofre San Diego County, CA 2013 SAFSTOR Ongoing ISFSI 
Vermont Yankee Vernon, VT 2014 SAFSTOR Ongoing ISFSI 
Source: Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Project Costs 
Decommissioning costs routinely reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars. For 
example, construction of the single-reactor Yankee Rowe plant was completed in 1960, at 
a cost of $39 million. Decommissioning was completed in 2007, at a cost of $608 million, 
more than twice the inflation-adjusted amount of the construction cost. The NRC 
therefore requires plant operators to maintain access to the minimum amount of money 
necessary for decommissioning activities throughout the life of the reactor, a figure 
determined by NRC formulas. Some early estimates pegged the cost of decommissioning 
at 10-15 percent of construction costs, but more recent estimates have pushed the upper 
bound to 25 percent of modern-day construction costs. Current federal estimates of 
decommissioning costs are lower, in the $300 million to $400 million range, which 
nevertheless represents a significant revision of the $105 million to $135 million estimate 
the agency provided into the 1990s. 
Recent cost estimates are well beyond the federal figures. Industry analysts have begun 
making site-specific cost estimates for future decommissionings in the $600 million 
range. In 2008, TLG Services, a decommissioning planning and consulting firm acquired 
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by Entergy in 2000, estimated that it would cost $914.5 million to decommission Pilgrim 
Station by 2048 if the plant was put into SAFSTOR in 2012. In fact, billion-dollar 
decommissioning procedures have been forecast by EnergySolutions, the group 
responsible for decommissioning the two reactors at Zion in Illinois, and by the owners of 
the recently closed, single-reactor Kewaunee Power Station in eastern Wisconsin. 
According to the PSDAR filed with the NRC for Vermont Yankee, Entergy expects the 
SAFSTOR decommissioning to cost $1.24 billion (in 2014 dollars), with major dismantling 
delayed until 2068. 
Workforce Adjustments 
Whether the plant operator chooses SAFSTOR or DECON, the plant workforce undergoes 
a similar adjustment, with four reductions occurring between five operational phases. The 
first reduction, between the time of the closure announcement and the actual shutdown, 
represents a workforce response, as employees examine other options: retirement, 
continued employment in the nuclear industry at other nuclear facilities or in the private 
sector, or a transfer to other utility work or some other industry. Closure announcements 
are generally made six months to a year before final shutdown. The shutdown is often 
timed to coincide with the end of the current fuel cycle, when the plant ordinarily goes 
offline for refueling. The most recent closure, at Vermont Yankee, was announced in 
August of 2013, a full 16 months before the plant was shut down at the end of December 
2014. The remaining reductions are a function of each phase’s employment requirements. 
On the next page, Table 2.5 describes these phases, as well as their likely durations before 
and after shutdown. Also on the next page, Figure 2.3 illustrates the similarity of staffing 
reduction plans at two New England plants, which were shut down more than 15 years 
apart, and decommissioned with different methods. Maine Yankee, shut down in 1997, 
was the larger plant of the two. It was decommissioned with the DECON option. Vermont 
Yankee, shut down in 2014, had a smaller workforce and output, and is currently in the 
early stages of the SAFSTOR mode. In both cases, within one year of shutdown the 
workforce had been trimmed by about half. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that Figure 2.3 does not include any 
decommissioning contractors. Under the SAFSTOR approach, their presence will be 
minimal for decades as the plant and its components undergo natural radioactive decay. 
In 2068, for example, Entergy expects the total site staffing at Vermont Yankee to jump 
from 24 to approximately 325 for the five years or so it will take to complete the 
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decommissioning, with contractors performing most of the on-site work. By contrast, the 
DECON approach requires a significant contractor presence on site shortly after 
shutdown, to begin the dismantlement: at Maine Yankee, for example, there were as many 
as 300 contractors on site in 2002, outnumbering the plant employees nearly 3:1. 
Table 2.5: Employee Reductions Phases in Nuclear Plant Closure 
Announcement Shutdown Hot Fuel Cool Fuel ISFSI Onwards 
6-12 mos. prior  Years 1 and 2 Years 3-6 Years 6 + 
Normal 
operational total 
at the power 
plant. 
Operational total 
as the plant goes 
offline. 
Reductions 
represent 
employee 
retirement or 
relocation after 
announcement. 
Workforce after 
plant ceases to 
produce 
electricity. 
Operations now 
limited to 
managing spent 
fuel, including 
“hot fuel” 
recently 
removed from 
reactor. 
Workforce after 
all hot fuel has 
sufficiently 
cooled for 
storage with 
remainder of 
spent fuel in 
underwater 
storage. 
Workforce after 
all fuel has been 
prepared for dry 
cask storage in 
on-site ISFSIs. 
Source: Entergy Corporation (Vermont Yankee); EPRI (Maine Yankee) 
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FIGURE 2. 3 : SAFSTOR AND DECON EMPLOYEE REDUCTION PATTERNS 
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Part Three: Pilgrim Station 
Contents and Summary 
Part Three provides an inventory of Pilgrim Station. Section One describes Pilgrim Station 
as a landowner and physical entity. This section describes the plant’s location and property 
holdings; its regulatory relationship with surrounding towns; characteristics of the power 
plant site; and a brief encapsulation of the plant’s history and license status. Section Two 
describes Pilgrim Station as an employer, identifying changes in staffing levels and 
occupational characteristics between 2005 and 2015, and providing a current residential 
distribution of Pilgrim Station employees by town. 
In summary, Pilgrim Station is a single-reactor 690 MW power plant owned by the 
Entergy Corporation, licensed to operate until 2032. It sits on a coastal parcel of 134 acres, 
the northernmost portion of Entergy’s 1,675 acres of contiguous land. Pilgrim Station 
provides 586 full time jobs, nearly three quarters of which belong to members of utility 
and security workers’ unions. Approximately half of the workforce lives in one of the five 
towns within ten miles of the plant, 190 of which are in Plymouth alone. Over 84 percent 
of employees live in either Plymouth or Barnstable counties, and only three live outside of 
Massachusetts.  
3.1 Site and Operations 
Pilgrim Station is in Plymouth, 
Massachusetts, on the shores of Cape 
Cod Bay. The major cities of Boston and 
Providence lie 38 miles to the north and 
44 miles to the west, respectively. Within 
Plymouth, the plant is 5.4 miles east of 
Town Hall, and 4.6 miles from the 
nearest highway on-ramp to 
Massachusetts Route 3. Portions of two 
seaside residential areas are within one 
mile of Pilgrim Station: the Rocky Point 
neighborhood to the west, and the village 
of Manomet to the southeast. Figure 3.1 provides the regional context for the plant, 
which lies between Greater Boston and Cape Cod.  
PILGRIM 
STATION 
 
FIGURE 3. 1: REGIONAL CONTEXT OF PILGRIM STATION 
Source: MassGIS 
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Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) 
All nuclear power 
plants are required to 
provide specialized 
emergency planning 
services and detailed 
evacuation plans for 
residents within a 
five-mile radius of the 
plant. Figure 3.2 
identifies the five 
Massachusetts towns 
within the EPZ: 
Plymouth, Kingston, 
Duxbury, Carver, and 
Marshfield. The EPZ 
includes all of 
Plymouth, Kingston, 
and Duxbury; the 
portion of Carver east 
of MA Route 58; and 
the small segment of 
Marshfield south of 
MA Route 139. The Pilgrim Station EPZ is a fairly straightforward geographic unit: five 
municipalities in one county. By contrast, Vermont Yankee’s EPZ included 18 
municipalities in a tri-county area that included the states of Vermont, New Hampshire, 
and Massachusetts. Elsewhere in the country, power plants frequently have to contend 
with an array of civic entities along the municipal spectrum, such as townships, boroughs, 
villages, unincorporated lands, and so on. The simplicity of the Pilgrim Station EPZ will 
likely work to the advantage of its constituent towns should they wish to negotiate jointly 
with plant ownership in the future.  
Source: MassGIS 
FIGURE 3. 2: THE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE  
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Properties   
The plant’s principal structures occupy a single parcel of 133.6 acres, zoned for light 
industry. This parcel is less than one-tenth of the contiguous 1,675-acre site owned by 
Entergy Nuclear Generating Company. The remainder of the site is primarily forested 
upland, and includes the peak of Manomet Hill, the highest point in Plymouth County. 
After acquiring the plant and site in 1999, Entergy placed 1,530 of these acres into an active 
forest management plan pursuant to Chapter 61 of the General Laws in conjunction with 
the state Department of Conservation and Recreation. Furthermore, the land is subject to 
a Restrictive Covenant that prevents any development of the land for any residential 
purposes under the current Payment in Lieu of Taxes Agreement (PILOT) between 
Entergy and the Town of Plymouth, described more fully in Part Four. Entergy’s only other 
property in the town is the Chiltonville Training Center, which sits on a 24-acre site four 
miles west of the plant. The extent of these land holdings are visible in Figure 3.3, below. 
FIGURE 3. 3: ENTERGY-OWNED PROPERTIES IN PLYMOUTH WITH LAND USE DESIGNATION 
Source: Plymouth Assessor’s Database; MassGIS 
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There are two parks near the plant. Cleft Rock Park is owned by the Town of Plymouth, 
and is surrounded by Entergy land north of State Road. The park is 8.7 acres, with some 
hiking trails, a picnic area, and unusual rock formation more than a dozen feet in height. 
When the weather is right, visitors standing on the rock can catch a clear view down to 
Cape Cod Bay. Emerson Park is on White Horse Road, one-fifth of a mile south of the 
intersection with Rocky Hill Road. The park is operated by the Plymouth Recreation 
Department, and is home to two tennis courts and one of Plymouth’s 13 youth baseball 
fields. Emerson Park was built on power plant land in 1976, and has remained the property 
of the plant owners since. 
In addition to these holdings, Entergy leases two properties in Plymouth, both related to 
emergency preparedness and off-site management. The first, known as the Joint 
Information Center, is at 71 Armstrong Road, just one mile from the junction of Route 44 
and Route 3. Owned by Duxbury Associates, the facility is primarily used as an emergency 
preparedness media center and training facility, and is zoned for light industrial uses. The 
second property, the Emergency Operations Center, is at 44 Obery Street. The Center is 
near the center of town, in a building owned by Plymouth County. 
Pilgrim Station Site 
Pilgrim Station’s boiling water reactor (BWR), designed by General Electric and built by 
the Bechtel Corporation, has a generation capacity of 690 megawatts (MW). The reactor 
has averaged approximately 5.4 million megawatt hours (MWh) of power generation per 
year over the past decade. Other plant components on site include the turbines, steam 
tower, office buildings, fuel storage facilities, switchyard, water intake structure, and 
boat/barge landing for sea access. An ISFSI is under construction, which is the subject of 
ongoing litigation in Massachusetts Land Court. 
Pilgrim Station is connected to the electric grid by two 345 kilovolt transmission lines that 
travel in a 300 foot-wide NSTAR Right of Way corridor along the eastern portions of 
Entergy’s property. The lines share a single set of towers that travel five miles from the 
Pilgrim Station switchyard to the Jordan Road substation. One of the transmission lines 
joins a previously existing line at the substation, while the other travels another 2.2 miles 
to the Snake Hill Road substation in Myles Standish State Forest. The total 12.2 miles of 
transmission line connecting Pilgrim Station to the grid are owned and operated by 
NSTAR, which also maintains the approximately 260 acres the Right of Way amounts to. 
 31 
 
History and License 
In 1967 the Boston Edison Company, a regulated public utility, began construction on 
Pilgrim Station. Construction was completed five years later, and the plant began 
supplying electricity to the public on December 1, 1972. Boston Edison owned and 
operated Pilgrim Station until 1999, when the utility began the process of merging with 
Commonwealth Energy System to form NSTAR. As a precursor to the merger, Boston 
Edison sold Pilgrim Station that year to its current owners, Entergy Corporation. This 
marked the country’s first sale of a public utility’s nuclear power plant to a private entity. 
The NRC approved the transfer of Pilgrim Station’s operating license from Boston Edison 
to Entergy Nuclear Generation Company on April 29, 1999. 
Shortly after taking ownership of the plant, Entergy began the process of obtaining a 
license renewal for Pilgrim Station. The application was submitted to the NRC in January 
2006, the start of a multi-year sequence requiring additional reports, impact statements, 
and safety evaluations to be generated and approved. The renewed license was issued in 
May 2012, and expires on June 8, 2032: 60 years to the day after the initial license was 
granted to Boston Edison. 
3.2 Employee Characteristics 
The Pilgrim Station workplace is predominantly male, and significantly unionized. Data 
provided by Entergy for this study stated that of the 586 employees at Pilgrim Station as 
of February 2015, only 15 percent are women, and 71 percent are union members. This 
level of labor organization is well above the national average of 30 percent for nuclear 
power plants. The 416 employees belong to one of three active union shops at Pilgrim 
Station, each representing a distinct workforce component at Pilgrim Station. 
Workforce Composition 
Two shops are locals of the Utility Workers Union of America (UWUA). The Braintree-
based UWUA Local 369 is the larger of the two, representing employees at twelve utility 
companies across Massachusetts. Among its 2013 total of 2,961 members were 
approximately 250 Pilgrim Station radiation technicians, power plant operators, 
maintenance mechanics, and other laborers. The smaller Local 590 is a 
professional/engineers union based out of Manomet in Plymouth. It is limited to 
engineers working at Pilgrim Station, with a 2013 membership total of 66. Also in 
Manomet is Local 25 of the United Government Security Officers of America (UGSOA). 
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The local, which is limited to Pilgrim Station’s security service personnel, counted 87 
members in 2013. 
In February 2005, there were 703 Pilgrim Station employees, of whom 574 were Entergy 
employees, and 129 were baseline contractor employees. In February 2015, Entergy 
provided an employee-only headcount of 586, and stated that contractor totals were 
unavailable. The similarity between the non-contractor total of 574 and 586 seems to 
suggest that the workforce has been relatively stable, perhaps even implying that the 
contractor levels have remained similar, but events since the 2005 headcount suggest that 
the composition has shifted significantly.  
At the time of the previous headcount, more than 100 of the baseline contractors were 
security guards employed by the Wackenhut Corporation, a security services company 
with numerous nuclear plant security contracts across the globe. In 2006, Entergy 
canceled its contract with Wackenhut, and offered to hire the existing security guards as 
Entergy employees. The security force accepted the offer, and began working directly for 
Entergy in January 2007. (Not coincidentally, this was the first year UGSOA Local 25 filed 
an annual report with the Department of Labor.) A review of union filings reveals that 
Local 590, the engineers union, has essentially remained steady since Entergy added the 
security personnel to their workforce. However, a letter from Local 369, filed with the NRC 
the same month that Entergy hired the former Wackenhut contractors, states that the local 
represented nearly 400 Pilgrim Station employees at the time, nearly 70 percent of 
Entergy’s non-contractor workforce. The conclusion, therefore, is that the plant simply 
has fewer operations and maintenance workers than it used to: today the number is 43 
percent. 
Age and Education 
One of the defining features of the civil nuclear workforce is that it is rapidly aging. With 
an average employee age in the mid-fifties, more than one third of the nation’s 
approximately 60,000 nuclear power plant workers will reach retirement age in the next 
five years. At 55 years old, the average nuclear power plant worker is older than 
approximately 76 percent of Plymouth’s residents. Aware of the unique needs of nuclear 
employers, and the emergency that a shortfall of human capital would represent, the 
industry has responded by implementing partnerships between the industry, universities, 
trade schools, and training facilities over the past decade.  
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The high degree of specialization required by nuclear power plants means that existing 
and potential employees benefit from specific educational systems. Nuclear energy is in 
need of those with bachelor’s degrees in nuclear engineering, computer engineering, 
mechanical engineering, civil engineering, and physics, and two year technical degrees in 
related fields. Recognizing this uncommon demand, many nuclear power plants, including 
Pilgrim Station, have partnered with technical schools and colleges to offer two and four 
year specialized degrees for nuclear labor preparation. Pilgrim currently partners with 
Massachusetts Maritime Academy and UMass Lowell to offer customized courses and 
certificates, and Entergy has made regular charitable donations to Mass Maritime since 
2007 (see Section 4.1 for more information). 
Residential Distribution 
According to a residential distribution provided by Entergy, only three employees live 
outside of Massachusetts, all in Rhode Island. As Figure 3.4 shows, Plymouth County 
(386 employees) and Barnstable County (109 employees) are the two most common 
counties of residence, accounting for nearly 85 percent of the Entergy’s employees at 
Pilgrim Station. Figure 3.5 shows the employment shares for the area’s three regional 
planning agencies, as well as the portion living in the South Shore Coalition subregion of 
the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC SSC). (The employment totals for 
Duxbury and Pembroke, which are part of both the OCPC and the SSC, have been allocated 
to the OCPC.)  
  
FIGURE 3. 5: 2015 EMPLOYEE RESIDENCE BY RPA 
Source: Entergy Corporation Source: Entergy Corporation 
FIGURE 3. 4: 2015 EMPLOYEE RESIDENCE BY COUNTY 
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The workforce is also markedly concentrated in the towns closest to the plant. There are 
Pilgrim Station employees living in 74 municipalities, yet there are nearly as many living 
in the five towns of the EPZ (292 employees) as there are in the non-EPZ towns (294 
employees). This distribution is detailed in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.6, below. By a wide 
margin, Plymouth is home to the greatest number of employees, with 190. Outside the 
EPZ, the greatest concentration of employees is in the towns of the Upper Cape. The local 
nature of the workforce means that not only is Pilgrim Station an important source of 
economic productivity for the region, it is also an important source of income, household 
spending, and property taxes. The implications are examined in Part Four. 
Table 3.1: 2015 Residential Distribution of Entergy Employees with EPZ Designation 
Geography Total Component Subtotal Community Headcount 
Within Emergency 
Planning Zone 
292 
Host Community 190 Plymouth 190 
Other OCPC Towns 
in EPZ 
45 Kingston 32 
Duxbury 13 
EPZ Towns outside 
OCPC 
57 Carver 33 
Marshfield 24 
Outside Emergency 
Planning Zone 
294 
CCC Towns 109 
Sandwich 40 
Bourne 25 
Barnstable 19 
Mashpee 10 
Other CCC 15 
SRPEDD Towns 
(without Carver) 
81 
Wareham 15 
Middleborough 15 
New Bedford 8 
Other SRPEDD 43 
MAPC SSC Towns 
(without Marshfield) 
40 
Weymouth 15 
Scituate 6 
Braintree 5 
Other SSC 14 
OCPC Towns   
(outside EPZ) 
32 
Pembroke 9 
Bridgewater 7 
Hanson 5 
Other OCPC 11 
Other Massachusetts 29 Quincy 
5 
Other MA 24 
Rhode Island 3 All RI 3 
Source: Entergy Corporation (2015)    
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FIGURE 3. 6: 2015 RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION OF ENTERGY EMPLOYEES WITH RPA DESIGNATION 
Source: Entergy Corporation; MassGIS 
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Part Four: Impacts of Pilgrim Station 
Contents and Summary 
Part Four introduces the impacts of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station on Plymouth and the 
surrounding region, in three sections. Section One is limited to the operational impacts 
directly attributable to Pilgrim Station itself: plant output; employee wages; procurement 
spending; taxes and other municipal payments; and charitable contributions. Section Two 
addresses some economic impacts indirectly attributable to Pilgrim Station’s operations: 
the spending of the temporary workforce that refuels Pilgrim Station’s reactor for 
approximately one month every two years; the local real estate taxes paid by Pilgrim 
Station employees annually; and the local industries most impacted by the household 
spending of employees. Section Three postulates the permanent closure of Pilgrim Station, 
and evaluates the cascading local and regional impacts that would accompany plant 
shutdown. 
In summary, a traditional account of the direct and secondary impacts of Pilgrim Station’s 
operation on the economies of Plymouth and Barnstable counties in 2014 would reach 
$545 million of economic output. This economic activity supported approximately 1,175 
jobs and $107 million in income; nearly 1,100 jobs and $95 million in income accrued to 
the two-county region. Direct regional expenditures totaled $136 million: $60 million in 
purchases from regional vendors; $65 million in wages and benefits for the 495 Pilgrim 
Station employees living in either of the two counties; $10.7 million in municipal 
payments, and $0.3 million in charitable giving. Pilgrim Station’s secondary impacts on 
the two counties were estimated to at $105 million in economic output, which created 
approximately 590 jobs earning nearly $30 million in income. 
Plant closure, therefore, would extend far beyond the direct impacts of the plant’s 
operations alone. Some of the hardest hit industries would be the region’s healthcare 
providers, real estate agencies, banking institutions, restaurants, and additional utility 
companies. Unlike the region’s considerable tourism and agriculture industries, these jobs 
are neither seasonal nor cyclical, and they provide the region with substantial economic 
stability. 
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4.1 Direct Operational Impacts 
As an enterprise owned and operated by a Louisiana-based Fortune 500 company, and 
powered by a fuel source that is not locally produced, it stands to reason that a good deal 
of Pilgrim Station’s output will leave the region. However, given that nuclear power plants 
pay as well as they do, employ as many people as they do, and require as many services as 
they do, robust local and regional economies are often able to retain a substantial portion 
of a plant’s O&M costs.  
Electric Output 
As is the case for many power plant impact analyses, the value of Pilgrim Station’s 
electricity generation is the starting point for the calculations that follow. Based on 
preliminary figures and the methodology described below, Pilgrim Station’s 2014 output 
was approximately $440 million. This is the plant’s total output, and it represents a “whole 
pie,” before slices of varying size are allocated to corporate and shareholder benefits, 
operations and maintenance, fuel costs, and other components. Every socioeconomic 
benefit that flows from Pilgrim Station to regional and local levels is tied to the market 
value of its power generation, as well. 
Pilgrim Station’s total economic output varies from year to year, however. As a nuclear 
power plant, Pilgrim Station goes offline every 24 months to replenish the reactor’s fuel 
supply and transport spent nuclear fuel to cooling pools. These outages last for 
approximately 30 days, reducing the plant’s total annual electrical output (see the 
following section for more information on refueling workforces). Furthermore, as a 
merchant plant operating outside of a regulated market and competing with other power 
suppliers, the value of Pilgrim Station’s electricity is subject to significant variation. 
To approximate the value of the electricity produced by Pilgrim Station in a given year, 
information from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) on plant capacity and 
regional power prices was combined with information on efficiency and output from the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). According to the EIA, the plant operated at 
99.2 percent capacity in 2010, generating 5.9 million megawatt-hours (MWh) of 
electricity. That year, the weighted average wholesale price in New England (referred to 
by the EIA as NEPOOL MH DA LMP Peak) was $55.93 per MWh, which yields an 
estimated $331 million of electricity. The following year, however, was very different: a 
planned outage for nuclear refueling diminished output to 5.1 million MWh, and the 
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average market price per MWh fell to $42.40. Under this approximation scheme, the total 
value of Pilgrim Station’s 2011 output would be a more modest $215.6 million. Table 4.1 
contains information for more recent years, as well, which shows the impacts of the recent 
increases in New England’s electricity prices. 
Table 4.1: Value Electric Output at Pilgrim Station, 2010-2014  
 Efficiency Total MWh Avg $/MWh Estimated Value 
2014 (preliminary) 98.6 5,769,150 $76.25 $439,897,688 
2013 (Refuel Apr-May) 72.9 4,330,643  $65.17  $282,219,773  
2012 98.2 5,859,540  $42.33  $248,033,391  
2011 (Refuel Apr-May) 85.5 5,085,220  $42.40  $215,631,635  
2010 99.2 5,917,813  $55.93  $330,954,060  
Source: US EIA (2013); IAEA Power Reactor Information System (2014) 
Employment and Wages 
Pilgrim Station provides a substantial number of permanent, full-time, and well-
compensated jobs. According to information provided by Entergy for this study, there are 
currently 586 full time Entergy employees at Pilgrim Station. This places the plant within 
the 20 largest employers in the OCPC, and makes it the third-largest employer in 
Plymouth behind the Town of Plymouth and the former Jordan Hospital (now known as 
Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital-Plymouth).  
Due to the specialized skill sets required for many jobs in the industry, wages at nuclear 
power plants exceed averages. Entergy’s payroll of $55 million translates to an average 
salary of $93,857 for the 586 employees at Pilgrim Station in February 2015. This is 
comparable to both national averages and the earnings at nearby plants like Seabrook 
Station, where the average salary is approximately $94,500. Most importantly, it 
compares quite favorably with local and regional income levels, more than doubling the 
values at both scales. As Table 4.2 shows on the following page, Pilgrim Station jobs 
account for just 0.45 percent of the jobs in the OCPC region, but 0.95 percent of the wages; 
in Plymouth the total is 2.5 percent of the jobs, and 5.3 percent of the wages paid (all 
according to 2012 values). 
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Table 4.2: 2015 Job and Wage Shares of Pilgrim Station, by Region 
Jobs Share Pilgrim Station Share Wages 
23,536 2.49% Plymouth Town 5.29% $1,038,922,395 
129,788 0.45% Old Colony 0.95% $5,803,798,710 
175,957 0.33% Plymouth County 0.69% $7,978,935,618 
Source: Old Colony Planning Council (2014) 
In fact, the presence of Pilgrim Station raises the average weekly wage paid in Plymouth 
by more than three percent, from $824 to $849. Figure 4.1 contains six average weekly 
wages for comparison: Pilgrim Station; Plymouth; Plymouth without Pilgrim Station; 
Plymouth; Barnstable County; Plymouth County; and the OCPC region. With the 
exception of Pilgrim Station, all weekly wage averages lagged behind the state average of 
$1,171, represented in the figure by a blue line. 
 
 
  
$1,805
$849
$824
$872
$785
$860
P I L G R I M  S T A T I O N
P L Y M O U T H  T O W N
P L Y M O U T H ,  N O  P I L G R I M
P L Y M O U T H  C O U N T Y
B A R N S T A B L E  C O U N T Y
O C P C  R E G I O N
MA Weekly Wage: $1,171 
FIGURE 4. 1: COMPARISON OF AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES, PILGRIM STATION AND SURROUNDING AREAS 
Source: Old Colony Planning Council (2014); US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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While it is unlikely that residential distribution is a perfect indicator of wage distribution, 
it helps give a sense of where the payroll is going. Applying the data in Table 3.1 to payroll, 
Table 4.3 below presents the estimated accrual of annual wages within the four regional 
planning agency service areas, identifying the top three towns in each area. Over 45 
percent of the payroll stays in the OCPC region, with nearly one-third remaining in 
Plymouth alone. Of particular note is the segment directed towards Cape Cod: it is by no 
means the largest number, but it represents year-round work in the area’s least prosperous 
and least populous region.  
The final row indicates the portion of each total that is within each RPA’s largest three 
towns. It is meant to give a sense of the extent to which the workforce and wages are 
clustered within the region. That the OCPC’s level would approach 90 percent is no 
surprise, given the high level of Pilgrim Station employees in Plymouth. Most interesting 
is the difference between SRPEDD and Cape Cod, where comparable numbers of 
employees have arranged themselves in markedly different patterns. One of the likeliest 
explanations is the difference in more extensive highway access in SRPEDD communities: 
few Cape residents who work at Pilgrim Station live very far from Route 6. 
Table 4.3: Estimated Wage Distribution, 2015 
Old Colony SRPEDD Cape Cod South Shore 
Plymouth 17.8 million Carver 3.1 million Sandwich 3.8 million Marshfield 2.3 million 
Kingston 3 million Wareham 1.4 million Bourne 2.3 million Weymouth 1.4 million 
Duxbury 1.2 million Middleboro 1.4 million Barnstable 1.8 million Scituate 0.6 million 
Other 3 million Other 4.8 million Other 2.3 million Other 1.8 million 
Totals $25 million  $10.7 million  $10.2 million  $6.1 million 
In Top 3 88 percent  55 percent  77 percent   70 percent 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Expenditures for Goods and Services 
In October 2014, a procurement engineer at Pilgrim Station wrote an open letter to a local 
newspaper in support of the plant. In it, he described an annual economic impact of over 
$125 million, a sum of the plant’s payroll, taxes, contributions, and the purchases of goods 
and services. Entergy declined to provide this study with purchase data of any kind, but 
given that the plant’s payroll ($55 million), local tax arrangement ($10 million), and 
annual donation totals ($350,000) are known quantities, we can infer that Pilgrim 
Station’s annual expenditures in the region are approximately $60 million. It is unclear 
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whether the “region” described is Plymouth County, Greater Boston, or the whole of 
southern New England, but it provides a useful starting point. 
Although such a total represents a fairly high level of non-payroll regional spending for a 
nuclear power plant, it is not unreasonable. Nuclear power plants spend millions of dollars 
each year on a variety of goods and services. Due to the highly specialized nature of nuclear 
power generation, a regional economy will only be able to supply a fraction of what a power 
plant needs, but regional strengths in certain fields can be rewarded. Table 4.4, below, 
details the extent to which this is the case. For example, in 2011, non-payroll purchases at 
Seabrook Station totaled $54 million within a tri-county region, and $179 million outside 
the region. That same year, non-payroll purchases at Diablo Canyon totaled $22 million 
in a two-county region, and $277 million outside the region. Where regional economies 
match poorly with nuclear power plant needs, the in-region spending can be minuscule: 
non-payroll purchases at Duane Arnold Energy Center totaled $2.2 million in a two-
county region, and $84 million outside the region. 
Table 4.4: Regional Accrual of Non-Payroll Expenditures 
 Goods & Services ($ millions) 
Plant State Region Non-Region Region PCT 
Diablo Canyon CA $21.8 $277.0 7.3% 
Duane Arnold IA $2.2 $76.7 2.8% 
Seabrook NH $54.4 $147.5 26.9% 
Source: Nuclear Energy Institute 
Plant spending reaches a number of industries, from caterers to petrochemical 
manufacturers. A review of industry research and promotional materials developed by 
regional chambers of commerce indicated that nuclear plant expenditures tend towards 
firms providing engineering, environmental, and other technical consulting services; 
chemical, machinery, and electronics manufacturing; utility systems construction and 
wiring; durable goods wholesale and rental; and general business support services. These 
needs can be grouped into six broad industry sectors, shown in Table 4.5 on the following 
page. The table includes the relevant employment and wage information from 2012 in 
Plymouth County for the industries described above, aggregated at the 3-digit NAICS 
scale. As the table shows, over one quarter of Plymouth County jobs are in one of the 
sectors identified, suggesting that the local economy is capable of meeting some of Pilgrim 
Station’s annual expenditures. 
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Table 4.5: Nuclear Power Plant Vendor Sectors in Plymouth County, 2012 
  Employment Earnings 
 Subsector Name Jobs Share Wages Relative 
Specialty 
Sectors 
Professional and Technical Services 6,913 3.9% $69,108 1.52 
Advanced Manufacturing 4,927 2.8% $63,332 1.40 
Specialty Construction 8,311 4.7% $62,660 1.38 
Durable Goods Wholesale and Leasing 2,900 1.6% $69,316 1.53 
General 
Sectors 
Administrative and Support Services 6,273 3.6% $36,556 0.81 
Food Services 16,979 9.6% $16,172 0.36 
Subtotals 
Specialty Sectors 23,051 13.1% $65,575 1.45 
General Sectors 23,252 13.2% $11,999 0.26 
Non-Vendor Industries 129,654 73.7% $45,993 1.01 
Total Plymouth County  175,957 100% $45,344 1.00 
Source: Massachusetts Department of Labor ES-202; Author’s calculations 
 
While the employment levels are evenly distributed between specialty services and general 
services, the table shows that the wages are not: earnings in the four specialty sectors are 
more than five times higher than the earnings in the two general sectors. Significantly, 
these specialty sectors exceed the average annual earnings in Plymouth County by nearly 
50 percent.  
The six sectors reach a variety of full-time, part-time, and seasonal industries. Table 4.6, 
on the following page, identifies some of the specific industries within the specialty and 
general sectors. Wage averages from 2012 within Plymouth County are provided for the 
specific 4-digit NAICS subsectors that these industries belong to, to demonstrate the 
earnings variation within each sector. For example, within the Advanced Manufacturing 
sector are eleven industries that provide services or products relevant to the nuclear power 
industry. These can be grouped into three subsectors of advanced manufacturing: 
chemicals and plastics manufacturing, fabricated metal products and machinery 
manufacturing, and computer and electronic products manufacturing. As the table shows, 
workers in the digital subsector earn nearly $20,000 per year more than workers in the 
metal and machinery subsector. 
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Table 4.6: Nuclear Power Plant Vendor Industries in Plymouth County, 2012 
SUBSECTORS NAICS Component Industries 
Professional and Technical Services 
Scientific & 
Technical Services: 
$79,093 
541330 Engineering Services 
541620 Environmental Consulting Services 
541690 Other Scientific and Technical Consulting Services 
   
Advanced Manufacturing 
Chemical & 
Plastics: $66,248 
325110 Petrochemical Manufacturing 
325180 Other Basic Inorganic Chemical Manufacturing 
Fabricated Metal 
Products & 
Machinery: 
$57,876 
332313 Plate Work Manufacturing 
332410 Power Boiler and Heat Exchanger Manufacturing 
332420 Metal Tank (Heavy Gauge) Manufacturing 
332811 Metal Heat Treating 
332911 Industrial Valve Manufacturing 
333611 Turbine and Turbine Generator Set Units Manufacturing 
Computers & 
Electronic 
Products: $77,718 
334517 Irradiation Apparatus Manufacturing 
334519 Other Measuring and Controlling Device Manufacturing 
335991 Carbon and Graphite Product Manufacturing 
   Specialty Construction 
Utility Systems & 
Wiring: $67,426 
237130 Power and Communication Line and Related Structures Construction 
238210 Electrical Contractors and Other Wiring Installation Contractors 
   
Durable Goods Wholesale and Leasing 
Industrial 
Machinery Sales & 
Rentals: $65,702 
423510 Metal Service Centers and Other Metal Merchant Wholesalers 
423830 Industrial Machinery and Equipment Merchant Wholesalers 
423990 Other Miscellaneous Durable Goods Merchant Wholesalers 
532490 Commercial and Industrial Machinery and Equipment Rental and 
Leasing 
   
Administrative and Support Services 
Office & Grounds 
Services: $31,123 
 
561311 Employment Placement Agencies 
561612 Security Guards and Patrol Services 
561730 Landscaping Services 
561790 Services to Buildings - Exterior Maintenance 
   
Food Services  
Entire Sector: 
$16,202 
722320 
722511 
Catering 
Full-Service Restaurants and Drinking Places 
   
Source: Massachusetts Department of Labor ES-202; Author’s calculations 
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Taxes and Municipal Payments 
Pilgrim Station’s annual state and local payments amount to approximately $17.4 million. 
Table 4.7 itemizes the spending by category and recipient. The bulk of the total is the 
negotiated PILOT payment the made to the Town of Plymouth, worth $10 million in 2013. 
With regional purchases estimated at $60 million annually (see preceding section), the 
sales tax rate of 6.25% would generate $3.75 million in state revenue. Entergy also makes 
an annual payment to the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) to 
support state preparedness for a nuclear energy-related event, in the amount of $2.6 
million in 2013. Similar payments totaling $1 million were sent to eight municipalities to 
offset the costs of local emergency preparedness activities associated with the operation of 
the plant. This includes all five towns within the EPZ, and three other communities outside 
the EPZ that provide reception centers if a nuclear event ever required local evacuation 
from Plymouth. 
Table 4.7: State & Local Payments  
Plymouth PILOT $10,000,000   
MA Sales Tax $3,750,000   
MEMA $2,600,000   
EPZ Towns 
 $245,000 Plymouth 
 $186,000 Marshfield 
$686,000 $85,000 Kingston 
 $85,000 Carver 
 $85,000 Duxbury 
Non-EPZ Towns 
 $114,000 Bridgewater 
$314,000 $100,000 Taunton 
 $100,000 Braintree 
Total $17,350,000   
Sources: Municipal interviews (2014); Author’s calculations. 
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PAYMENT IN LIEU OF TAXES (PILOT) 
In the years following the sale of Pilgrim Station to Entergy in 2000, the company paid a 
relatively small property tax while the previous owner, NSTAR, gradually stepped down 
its obligations to the Town of Plymouth. Between 2000 and 2006, Entergy paid a modest 
$9.45 million in property taxes. By comparison, NSTAR paid Plymouth $118.12 million in 
the same period, under the terms of an agreement reached with the town prior to the sale 
of the plant. 
On April 24, 2007 the town reached a new PILOT (Payment in Lieu of Taxes) agreement 
with Entergy, netting the town a total of approximately $55 million through fiscal year 
2013. Plymouth has continued managing taxes using a PILOT with Entergy. The current 
PILOT, which expires in 2016, states that Entergy will pay the town $10 Million in FY 
2014, $9.5 Million in FY 2015, and $9.25 Million in FY 2016. The PILOT states that “the 
agreement is a good faith negotiation so that Entergy’s payments to the Town each year 
will be equivalent of the property tax obligations which would otherwise be owed to 
Plymouth by Entergy based on full and fair cash valuation.” The document further states 
that Entergy will neither sell nor develop any of the forested lands in owns in Plymouth 
for the duration of the PILOT. However, this clause, along with the rest of the PILOT’s 
terms, is nullified if Entergy files a notice of intent to decommission the plant.  
LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Entergy’s municipal payments are not confined to nuclear preparedness activities alone. 
Instead, recipients are able to allocate the funds where needed. In the aftermath of 
Hurricane Sandy, for instance, Marshfield used a portion of its funding to meet immediate 
cleanup needs. Most often, however, the funds are spent on maintenance needs, staff 
salaries and trainings for volunteers and town personnel, and the purchase of new 
equipment. Four OCPC towns receive a total of $529,000 in preparedness funding from 
Entergy: Plymouth, Kingston, Duxbury within the EPZ, and Bridgewater outside of it. On 
the next page, Table 4.8 details how three of the OCPC towns allocated their respective 
funds. Please note that in Kingston and Duxbury, the Emergency Management 
Department staff is each town’s Fire Chief and Deputy Fire Chief, so the payment covers 
only a portion of their respective salaries. In Plymouth, the Office of Emergency 
Management’s staff is a standalone office, and its payroll is entirely drawn from the 
Entergy payment. 
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Table 4.8: Allocation of Pilgrim Station Resources in EPZ Towns, 2014 
 Kingston Duxbury Plymouth 
Salaries & Stipends $20,000 $47,000 $167,000 
Departmental Salary $8,000 $45,000 $109,000 
Personnel Trainings $12,000 $2,000 $58,000 
Maintenance $10,000 $4,000 - 
Equipment & Other $55,000 $34,000 $78,000 
Major Expenditures Communications: 
hardware 
Laptops 
Flat screen display 
Radio equipment for 
police cruisers and 
harbormaster 
Communications: 
software 
Web/IT services 
Utilities 
Internet service 
Communications: 
hardware 
Internet service 
Web/IT services 
Radiation 
detection 
equipment 
Other Expenditures Office supplies 
Shelter equipment 
Radio equipment 
Office supplies 
Staff benefits 
Office supplies 
TOTAL  $85,000 $85,000 $245,000 
Source: Municipal interviews by Practicum students (2014) 
STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
The Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) is the state agency 
responsible for coordinating federal, state, local, voluntary, and private resources during 
emergencies and disasters in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. To be actively 
prepared for nuclear events, MEMA relies on the Nuclear Preparedness Department 
(NPD). The NPD is responsible for overseeing planning, training, equipment and exercises 
to support a radiological emergency response for the Massachusetts population within the 
EPZ through the Nuclear Safety Preparedness Program (NSPP). The NSPP provides step-
by-step guidance to effective communications responses for the communities in the EPZ, 
as well as the three host communities. 
In FY 2014, MEMA’s budget was approximately $11 million. Entergy provided $2.6 
million, nearly one quarter of the total. The contribution completely underwrote the 
$442,000 budget of the NSPP, as well as the $298,000 budget of MEMA’s Radiological 
Emergency Response Plan Evaluations (RERPE). The remaining $1.9 million stayed 
within MEMA for wages, benefits, and operating expenses unrelated to those incurred by 
the NSPP or the RERPE. 
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CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 
In 2013, Entergy contributed $297,900 to regional non-profits, civic organizations, and 
charities in Plymouth and neighboring towns: $247,900 in contributions, and $50,000 in 
corporate sponsorships. Despite being slightly lower than the average of $350,000 
donated in previous years, the funding serves a number of valuable environmental, 
educational, and elder services in the area.  
Financial contributions from Entergy are disbursed through two channels: foundation 
grants and corporate grants. The Entergy Charitable Foundation (ECF), a 501(c)(3) 
private non-operating foundation, was established in 2000 to support initiatives 
addressing income, educational, and literacy issues in areas where Entergy operates. The 
donations must be itemized with annual IRS filings. As Table 4.9 shows on the following 
page, ECF grants awarded in the area totaled $285,969 between 2003 and 2013. In that 
time, $207,538 was directed towards organizations in Plymouth (such as the town’s public 
school system) or to support an outside organization’s initiatives in Plymouth (such as 
Operation Outreach-USA). Plymouth-directed ECF grants account for 73 percent of the 
total in Table 4.8. 
In recent years, however, the grants have become more widely distributed throughout 
Plymouth and Barnstable counties. For the five year period from 2009 to 2013, $63,600 
in ECF grants reached Plymouth, while $75,000 was distributed to groups in other towns. 
Slightly under half of the 2009-2013 total has gone to Mass Maritime and the Plymouth 
Public Library, each of which have received over $30,000 in that time.  
Organizations with missions aimed at general community well-being, such as 
environmental groups, are encouraged to apply for funding through a series of grant 
programs administered by the corporation itself. These grants have contributed well over 
$150,000 in the past decade, in addition to the ECF grants detailed above. The Entergy 
Environmental Stewardship Grant, for instance, provided a total of $76,500 of funding to 
four non-profits while it was operational between 2003 and 2008: the Friends of Ellisville 
Island Marsh received at least $30,000; the New England Wildlife Center in Weymouth 
received $7,000 (in addition to its $22,000 ECF grants); Plimoth Plantation received 
$10,000 (as well as an ECF grant for $16,100), and the National Marine Life Center in 
Bourne received $44,500. This is not a complete list, however, as these contributions are 
not filed with the federal government in publicly available documents. 
  
 48 
 
Table 4.9: Entergy Charitable Foundation Grants, 2003-2013 
ECF Grant Recipient Location Description 2003-08 2009-13 Total 
American National Red Cross Cambridge Hurricane Irene relief  $5,000 $5,000 
Children’s Discovery Museum Mashpee Outdoor festival  $1,000 $1,000 
Father Bill's & MainSpring Plymouth Homelessness in Plymouth  $2,500 $2,500 
Habitat for Humanity Carver Affordable housing  $2,500 $2,500 
March of Dimes Bourne Annual fundraiser  $3,000 $3,000 
Massachusetts Maritime Academy Bourne Tutoring/training programs $9,500 $35,000 $44,500 
New England Wildlife Center Weymouth Environmental education $5,000 $17,000 $22,000 
Old Colony YMCA Brockton Campaign drive  $10,000 $10,000 
Operation Outreach-USA Holliston Plymouth literacy programs $4,000 $9,000 $13,000 
Partners Home Care Plymouth Maternal and child health  $1,000 $1,000 
Plymouth Public Library Corporation Plymouth Literacy for Life program $55,719 $31,600 $87,319 
Plymouth Public Schools Plymouth Engineering in the classroom $5,000 $6,000 $11,000 
REACH Plymouth Silent auction  $1,000 $1,000 
Score For A Cure Hanson Soccer tournament  $1,500 $1,500 
South Shore Community Action Council Plymouth Senior hunger prevention  $7,500 $7,500 
Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society Plymouth Fundraising campaign  $5,000 $5,000 
Other Plymouth Recipients Plymouth No ECF grants since 2008 $51,500  $51,500 
Other Non-Plymouth Recipients Various No ECF grants since 2008 $16,650  $16,650 
  ECF Grant Totals $147,369 $138,600 $285,969 
Source: Entergy Charitable Foundation, compiled by Practicum students    
4.2 Secondary Operational Impacts 
Pilgrim Station also leaves its mark on the regional economy through more indirect means. 
If Pilgrim Station hires a contractor in the region to install a new security system, this is a 
direct impact to the region. If the contractor then purchases parts for the job from a 
supplier in the region, this is an indirect impact to the region: money spent in the region 
by Pilgrim Station resulted in money spent in the region by the contractor. Similarly, if a 
contractor in the region is awarded a contract and hires additional workers living in the 
region to fulfill the terms, the plant has indirectly created additional jobs in the region. 
Along with this commercial effect on the supply chain, household spending by employees 
living in the region also creates additional economic output and employment. A workforce 
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with a substantial payroll and extensive healthcare and pension benefits elevates local 
demand for health practitioners’ offices, banking establishments, restaurants, hospitals, 
and real estate services. 
Economic and Jobs Multipliers 
In traditional input/output analysis, Pilgrim Station’s direct impacts on the region’s 
economic output, labor income (including payroll, benefits, pensions and other 
compensation), and employment levels are combined with its secondary impacts on the 
same components to determine a total impact. Without expenditure data from Entergy, 
however, it is difficult to estimate how business-to-business transactions might unfold 
across the region. Furthermore, the inclusion of all $440 million of Pilgrim Station’s 2014 
direct output can provide a misleading image of the plant’s impact. Revenue that 
immediately leaves the region (in the form of shareholder returns or out-of-state executive 
compensation, for example) does not have a direct impact on the local economy. While 
there are limitations to the usefulness of such an approach, particularly in its relevance for 
the Town of Plymouth, some of the secondary impact levels are worth considering. 
To provide a sense of the range, the data in Table 4.10 on the next page has been culled 
from economic impact analyses that used IMPLAN, the most common of the several 
input/output programs used to assess nuclear power plant benefits in recent years. It 
includes regional-level impact data from three nuclear plants in New England, as well as 
an estimate for Pilgrim Station based on the other studies. Since input-output analyses 
occur at the county level, Pilgrim Station’s inputs represent only Plymouth and Barnstable 
counties. Furthermore, since Pilgrim Station’s payroll figures do not include benefits and 
other employee compensation, the number has been increased by 40 percent, the industry 
standard for benefit estimates. As a result, the labor income of the 495 jobs held by 
residents of the counties has been increased from $46.5 million (wages only) to $65 
million. The result is four secondary impact scenarios. 
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Table 4.10: Annual Secondary Impact Scenarios for Pilgrim Station 
Direct Impact 
Benchmarks 
Secondary Impact Values 
VT Yankee 
tri-county 
Millstone 
single county 
Seabrook 
tri-county 
Pilgrim 
two county 
$1.00 of plant output $0.23  $0.24  $0.34  $0.24 
Pilgrim = $440m output 101.2m 105.6m 149.6m 105.6m 
$1.00 of labor income $0.30  $0.62  $0.77  $0.46 
Pilgrim = $65m income 19.5m 40.3m 50.1m 29.9m 
100 plant jobs 122 119 228 119 
Pilgrim = 495 jobs 604 589 1,129 589 
Total Impacts     
Economic Output $541.2m $545.6m $589.6m $545.6m 
Labor Income $84.5m $105.3m $115.1m $94.9m 
Jobs Generated 1,099 1,084 1,624 1,084 
Source: Donahue Institute (VT Yankee); Nuclear Energy Institute (all others) 
 
As the table shows, impacts vary based on local conditions and study area size, just as with 
plant expenditures in Table 4.4, above. The three New England plants share some broad 
characteristics. The two noteworthy departures are the low level of indirect labor income 
generated by Vermont Yankee, and the high level of job creation at Seabrook.  This are 
likely explained by the industry mix in the markedly rural Vermont Yankee study area 
having met fewer of the plant’s manufacturing and technical needs when compared to the 
other plants, and of Seabrook’s study area including three counties in the Greater Boston 
area. 
Pilgrim Station functions in an economically diverse county with a variety of 
manufacturing, service, professional, transportation, and wholesale industries, along with 
a large utilities sector providing relevant skills and expertise. The regional economy, 
therefore, is likely able to meet many of the day-to-day needs of both the plant and its 
locally-settled workforce. Like Millstone, Pilgrim Station is a large economic producer and 
consumer in a thickly-settled region, and its levels of secondary economic output and jobs 
created are good estimates for the plant. However, with nearly 1,100 Millstone employees 
living in the single-county study area, the household spending greatly exceeds what could 
be expected in the Pilgrim Station study area. As a result, Millstone’s remarkably high level 
of secondary labor income for a single county is likely not applicable to Pilgrim Station. A 
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value between Millstone and Vermont Yankee is a reasonable approximation, in which 
every $1.00 of income earned by Pilgrim Station employees in the study area creates an 
additional $0.46 of labor income.  
Therefore, Pilgrim Station’s revenues and expenditures in Plymouth and Barnstable 
counties are estimated to have generated an additional $105.6 million in economic output 
in 2014. The boost provided by this secondary economic activity created 459 jobs in the 
county that earned $23.3 million in labor income. 
To better illustrate the ways in which secondary impacts the local economy, two special 
cases are examined: the refueling workforce, and household taxes. 
Refueling Workforce 
As mentioned above, Pilgrim Station goes offline every other year to replenish the reactor’s 
supply of nuclear fuel. This outage ordinarily begins in April and ends in May, in the 
“shoulder-season” before the tourism industry in Plymouth and Cape Cod takes off. 
During the 30-40 days it takes to complete the task, between 700 and 900 contractors join 
the Pilgrim Station workforce. (The baseline workforce remains active, as the outage 
provides an opportunity to conduct certain repairs that are otherwise difficult to 
complete.) Very few of these temporary employees are local, as traveling contractors 
perform most refueling work. A relatively small share of their earnings enter the local or 
regional economy, since they work very long hours and bank most of their wages as part 
of the “peaks and valleys” income that characterizes such contract work. 
Completed in the wake of Kewaunee Power Station’s closure in 2013, one recent analysis 
in the Upper Midwest estimated that these transient employees spend approximately $95 
per day during the refueling outage: $25 for food, $60 for lodging, $5 for gasoline, and $5 
for general merchandise. In New England, Seabrook Station’s Site Vice President recently 
stated that the 1,000 contract workers on hand for the plant’s refueling added $4.5 million 
to the local economy during the project’s 30 days, resulting in a per diem of $150 per 
worker. While these figures were estimates, the difference in per diem spending likely 
reflects New England’s relatively high cost of living. 
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These per diem values are included in 
Table 4.11, which estimates the total 
spending by refueling contractors for a 
given outage at three per diem levels, 
with “low-high” values for outage 
duration and workforce size. The totals 
range from a low of nearly $2 million 
to a high of $5.4 million. In all cases, 
the bulk of the spending goes to food 
and lodging. It is important to note 
that these numbers represent total 
spending by the refueling workforce, and make no assertions about where this money is 
spent. The following paragraph outlines the implications for Plymouth. 
Meals and hotel occupancy are two of Plymouth’s sources of excise tax revenue. A meals 
tax of 0.25 percent went into effect in July of 2014, to finance the cost of a new municipal 
center and renovate a historic courthouse. The room occupancy tax, which was raised from 
4 percent to 6 percent in 2010, supports the town’s Tourism Promotion Fund. Since 1996, 
45 percent of the room occupancy tax receipts have gone to the fund. Approximating the 
spending pattern established by the study such that 25 percent of spending goes to meals 
and 60 percent of spending goes to lodging, and assuming that 30 percent of the refueling 
workforce’s spending will stay in Plymouth during an outage, the municipal receipts from 
the contractor spending ranges from $22,668 for a 30-day, 700-employee refueling at a 
low per-diem ($1,122 from meals and $21,546 from lodging), to a high of $61,358 for a 40-
day, 900-employee refueling at a high per-diem ($3,038 from meals and $58,320 from 
lodging). 
  
Table 4.11: Refueling Workforce Spending 
 Duration Workforce Size 
Per Diem  700 jobs 900 jobs 
$95/day 
(Kewaunee) 
30 days $1,995,000 $2,565,000 
40 days $2,660,000 $3,420,000 
$125/day 
(mid-range) 
30 days $2,625,000 $3,375,000 
40 days $3,500,000 $4,500,000 
$150/day 
(Seabrook) 
30 days $3,150,000 $4,050,000 
40 days $4,200,000 $5,400,000 
Source: Deller (Kewaunee); Walsh (Seabrook) 
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Residential Tax Revenues 
Given the long-term stability of nuclear power plant employment, the relatively high 
wages, and the advanced workforce age that is common throughout the industry, it is likely 
that Pilgrim Station’s workforce enjoys a high level of home ownership. Table 4.12 shows 
the median home values and mill rates from 2015 applied to the residential distribution 
for ten of the largest municipalities. While not all employees are homeowners, this 
establishes a useful approximation. For the EPZ towns of Kingston, Carver, and Duxbury, 
the annual property tax payment of Pilgrim Station employees calculated here is well 
above the annual EPZ payment from the plant itself. 
Table 4.12: Estimated Property Tax Payments by Pilgrim Station Employees, 2015 
Town Workers Region 
Median 
Home 
Employee Real 
Estate Value 
Mill 
Rate 
Annual 
Payment 
Plymouth 190 OCPC $307,733  $58.47 million 15.54 $908,580 
Sandwich 40 Cape Cod $349,500  $13.98 million 14.82 $207,200 
Kingston 32 OCPC $329,512  $10.54 million 16.94 $178,624 
Carver 33 SRPEDD $259,100  $8.55 million 17.01 $145,431 
Duxbury 13 OCPC $609,200  $7.92 million 15.60 $123,552 
Marshfield 24 MAPC SSC $386,700  $9.28 million 13.29 $123,336 
Bourne 25 Cape Cod $388,779  $9.72 million 10.07 $97,875 
Barnstable 19 Cape Cod $457,349  $8.69 million 9.30 $80,807 
Middleboro 15 SRPEDD $261,500  $3.92 million 15.78 $61,890 
Weymouth 15 MAPC SSC $302,016  $4.53 million 12.90 $58,440 
Source: Massachusetts Department of Revenue; Author’s calculations 
The large Pilgrim Station population living in Plymouth results in a significant amount of 
real estate ownership in Plymouth, nearing $58.5 million. This yields annual residential 
property taxes in excess of $908,000. This total is augmented by additional annual taxes, 
such as the motor vehicle excise tax. In 2012, for example, the 55,236 vehicles in Plymouth 
generated $6.39 million in revenue for the town, for an average of $115.70 per vehicle. 
Assuming that Plymouth’s Pilgrim Station households are two-car families, the motor 
vehicle taxes that year would have reached $43,966 ($44,948 in 2015 dollars). 
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In light of the elevated income levels of Pilgrim Station employees relative to Plymouth, 
the estimates for Plymouth’s share of real estate and motor vehicle taxes from plant 
employees is likely a conservative one. Nevertheless, based on the calculations above, the 
2015 total for these two revenue streams is $953,528. 
4.3 Closure Impacts 
Pilgrim Station’s direct and secondary impacts bring a number of socioeconomic benefits 
to Plymouth and the broader region, in the form of jobs, wages, home ownership, 
business-to-business spending, household spending, municipal revenues, and support for 
civic institutions. In the Town of Plymouth, direct impacts from wages, benefits, and 
municipal payments alone surpassed $35 million. Plant closure would immediately reduce 
many of these impacts. Employment levels would decline by about half in the year 
following closure, with further reductions in subsequent years until the plant employed no 
more than two dozen people after five to seven years: a workforce reduction of over 95 
percent. Local expenditures would taper off as well, as fewer components would need 
inspection, maintenance, or replacement. Donations and other charitable contributions 
would cease, as would the emergency preparedness payments to the state and individual 
towns. Finally, the PILOT arrangement Entergy and the Town of Plymouth have regarding 
Pilgrim Station would be revisited, and likely drawn downward substantially by as much 
as 90 percent in the first year. Meanwhile, other sources of economic activity in Plymouth 
and the surrounding towns would begin to slow down as well, as the industries closely tied 
to the operation of Pilgrim Station adjust to decreased demand, and the households 
directly or indirectly reliant on Pilgrim Station for income revise their budgets.  
Economic Activity and Output 
Pilgrim Station directly employs 586 people full-time. Its annual payroll of approximately 
$55 million provides an average weekly wage that is more than double the average weekly 
wage in the OCPC region, where approximately half of the workforce lives. Whatever their 
occupation, nearly all employees at a nuclear plant enjoy a higher rate of pay than similar 
occupations in other local industries. Those employees with management positions, 
supervisory responsibilities, or other industry-specific skill sets are likely to look 
elsewhere for employment at another nuclear power plant, which in all likelihood means 
moving away from the area. Depending on the occupational composition of Pilgrim 
Station employees living in Plymouth, this could mean the loss of several dozen families, 
potentially putting a number of houses on the market in short order. However, employees 
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performing more general tasks at the plant are less likely to be in-demand elsewhere in 
the nuclear power industry. For these employees, many of whom are locals, the most 
feasible option is looking for a similar job in the area. For them, Pilgrim Station’s closure 
represents a loss of future earnings, as the wage premium provided by the plant will be 
hard to find elsewhere in the region.  
Plant expenditures on goods and services in the area, along with discretionary spending 
from households, is estimated to create more than $105 million in economic activity in 
Plymouth and Barnstable counties, along with 589 additional jobs in the region that 
provide $30 million in income. Plant closure would therefore result in the loss of hundreds 
of well-paying jobs at Pilgrim Station, as well as hundreds more jobs in the area. Industries 
likely to feel the closure’s impacts most directly are in the utilities sector (such as NSTAR 
and other transmission entities), accommodation and food service industries, banking 
institutions, real estate agencies, and health care practitioners. In some households, the 
loss of indirect employment related to the power plant could be the difference between 
getting by and not making ends meet. 
Local Government Revenues 
Four OCPC municipalities receive annual financial payments from Pilgrim Station, 
relating to their interactions with the plant while it is operational. Approximately $10 
million goes to Plymouth, nearly all of which is based on the plant’s value while it produces 
electricity. This amount, therefore, would be greatly reduced in the event of the plant’s 
closure. The OCPC towns of Kingston, Duxbury, and Bridgewater each receive over 
$100,000 per year, as well. (Outside the OCPC, the towns of Carver, Marshfield, Taunton, 
and Braintree receive annual payments of a similar amount.) These payments would cease 
with the plant’s closure, since the existence of the Emergency Planning Zone is tied to the 
plant’s operation. In many towns, these payments are used to fund in part the salaries of 
fire chiefs and other vital public employees, as well as to provide equipment upgrades to 
police and other municipal agencies at no cost to the public. 
Local governments may also be affected by plant closure through a decrease in property 
tax rolls as employees move away to find work outside the area. While some employees 
would remain in place whether retiring or looking for new work, many would look for 
opportunities at other power plants within the company or elsewhere in the wider nuclear 
industry. With closure studies finding that as much as half of the workforce is likely to 
move away, this could lead to a noticeable drop in the property tax revenues in towns 
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where annual property taxes paid by Pilgrim Station employees is in the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. However, there is not enough research on record to determine with 
certainty how the process might unfold, and many questions remain about property values 
and nuclear power plant activities. See Appendix B for a local example. 
The most significant challenge will be in Plymouth, where the PILOT payment, emergency 
planning grant, and residential property tax and motor vehicle excise tax revenues from 
plant employees totaled approximately $11.2 million in 2014. Once the plant is shut down, 
plant officials are likely to lobby for a reduction in plant valuation on the order of 90 
percent. Although the town’s ongoing success with the Pinehills residential development 
has brought new sources of tax revenue to the town, the $10 million in direct payments 
from the plant is the equivalent of the average tax bill from 2,091 Plymouth single-family 
residences, more than 10 percent of the town’s total. 
Non-Profit and Civic Institutions 
Regional non-profits, civic organizations, and charities receive approximately $300,000 
per year from Pilgrim Station, much of it directed toward environmental, educational, and 
elder services in Plymouth and neighboring towns. This total does not include in-kind 
gifts, employee giving, or volunteering. Direct contributions from Entergy would all but 
cease with Pilgrim Station’s closure, and employee giving would decline significantly. 
While larger institutions will have a more difficult time meeting fundraising goals for 
special initiatives, most at risk are the smaller entities receiving regular support from 
Entergy for day-to-day operations. For example, a review of IRS filings reveals that the 
Friends of Ellisville Marsh has received a total of $154,973 in dues and contributions, and 
since its founding in 2007. While the $30,000 from Entergy’s Environmental Stewardship 
Grant alone would account for nearly 20 percent of the group’s lifetime revenues, a 
number of other Entergy donations to the group have been acknowledged in newsletters 
and media reports without making the dollar amounts public.  
Land Development 
Between 2004 and 2012, one-third of the building permits issued for single family housing 
in the OCPC were issued in Plymouth, and the number of single homes is now at 18,157. 
Pilgrim Station is one of the largest private landowners in Plymouth, and its closure could 
put hundreds of acres of potentially developable land on the market. More than 1,500 of 
Entergy’s 1,700 acres are currently under non-permanent 61A protection, and several of 
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its parcels zoned for residential use or mixed use are adjacent to medium-to-high density 
residential development. 
While short-term development is not a significant risk, portions of Entergy’s land holdings 
are miles away from the power plant itself. Depending on the levels of radiation detected 
at various points around the entire property, it is possible that some more remote parcels 
may have radiation levels low enough to make a partial site release feasible within ten 
years of plant closure. Two parcels bordering Manomet Village may have significant 
development potential: one where State Road meets Edison Access Road and Elliot Lane, 
and the other along White Horse Road by Emerson Park. 
In FY 15, Plymouth’s total property valuation was 79 percent residential, 9 percent 
commercial, 9 percent industrial, and 3 percent personal property. Pilgrim Station, zoned 
light industrial, was valued at $611.3 million, accounting for 74 percent of the total 
industrial valuation in the town, and a full 32.4 percent of the town’s non-residential tax 
base. In the event of Pilgrim Station’s closure, the plant’s value will decline significantly, 
likely to less than one tenth of its pre-closure assessment. Current concerns about the 
town’s balance of tax bases would be further amplified, with the vast majority of the 
burden falling to the residential properties.  
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Part Five: Recommendations 
Contents and Summary 
Given the nature and extent of nuclear plant closure impacts, and the difficulty of 
mitigating those impacts with traditional approaches to plant closure, planning efforts 
should be undertaken far in advance of the closure’s announcement. This study 
recommends the following initiatives to the OCPC and the Town of Plymouth, grouped in 
three interrelated categories: 
BUILDING KNOWLEDGE 
This category includes recommendations that will enable Plymouth and the OCPC to build 
their knowledge of plant closure impacts and processes well in advance of the event. Public 
attention focuses on issues of safety and site reuse, often leaving planning and economic 
development officials with little time to address the socioeconomic impacts this report has 
outlined. 
BUILDING SUPPORT  
Nuclear power plant closure is given scant consideration as a local economic development 
concern by most policymakers. However, the process of decommissioning a nuclear power 
plant is inherently a matter of public interest, and Plymouth and the OCPC can take 
advantage of some growing awareness of plant closure impacts to bring allied groups into 
the fold and make the best use of potential partnerships.   
BUILDING MOMENTUM 
Plymouth and the OCPC have an opportunity to take a prominent role in shaping the 
future of nuclear power plant closure resilience. Local and regional planning provides an 
opportunity to articulate goals through a public process, secure assistance with technical 
issues, and define measurable progress towards objectives.  
5.1 Building Knowledge 
Develop detailed assessments of Pilgrim Station’s socioeconomic benefits, to better 
understand how direct impacts cycle through the region. 
High Priority, Near Term: With additional detail on plant expenditures, workforce 
demographics, and occupational characteristics, Plymouth and the OCPC could pinpoint 
areas of greatest or least concern. An ongoing survey, undertaken at regular intervals, 
could help determine how Pilgrim Station’s operations support existing businesses, 
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municipal activities, and non-profit interests. A clearer picture of the impacts will help 
officials make a stronger case for planning. 
Stay abreast of the regulatory and legal considerations that can affect closure timelines, 
decommissioning strategies, and fuel storage. 
Medium Priority, Medium Term: Through the town’s Nuclear Matters Committee or 
other relevant group, Plymouth and the OCPC should become familiar with the ongoing 
developments in the nuclear energy industry and regulatory sphere. For instance, in 2013 
a federal court ruled that the NRC and DOE had acted illegally in shelving the Yucca 
Mountain repository application process after 2009, and ordered the NRC to resume its 
review of the DOE’s application to establish the nation’s long-term waste repository there. 
On the reactor lifespan side, the DOE has tasked Idaho National Laboratory to research 
the possibility of extending the lifetime of reactors like Pilgrim Station’s beyond the 
current 60-year licensing period. While these may not have the immediate implications 
that the ISFSI case currently before the Land Court does, it provides crucial context for 
understanding and managing public perceptions of risk. 
Match existing best practices for major plant closure to Pilgrim Station specifics, to 
determine goodness-of-fit for nuclear power plant closure. 
Lower Priority, Medium Term: With OCPC support, Plymouth should consider 
reviewing existing best practices for a number of closure types. Energy plants have similar 
infrastructure, but fewer employees; Manufacturing plants have similar employment, but 
more workforce redevelopment options; military bases have similar economic impacts, 
but more robust assistance programs. A broad review will help determine whether a 
cafeteria approach would be useful, or if an existing approach could be tweaked to fit 
Pilgrim Station.  
5.2 Building Support 
Create and maintain a non-adversarial process that keeps parties involved, aware, and 
focused on socioeconomic impact mitigation. 
Highest Priority, Near Term: The OCPC should consider encouraging representatives of 
Pilgrim Station and NSTAR to participate in any post-operational impact mitigation 
planning. By starting early, mutually-beneficial objectives can be explored, relevant issues 
can be considered in a low-pressure environment, and long-term partnerships can 
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continue to develop. This will likely bring more useful data from the private sector into the 
planning process for refining the socioeconomic described in this report. 
Identify key stakeholders to determine roles and coordinate preparation. 
High Priority, Near Term: There are a number of local and regional entities that could 
provide useful information, assistance, or support if they are made aware of the impacts 
Pilgrim Station’s closure could have on them or their constituents. This report included 
residential and financial data for the regional planning entities affected by the closure, to 
help the OCPC make the case for buy-in to these entities. Labor unions are also important 
stakeholders, as well as potential resources for understanding the plant’s workforce in 
depth. For example, the area’s Workforce Investment Boards, such as the South Shore 
WIB and the Cape & Islands WIB, could be engaged to develop “next phase” workforce 
retraining options for former power plant employees in the event of closure. 
Build relationships with the state and federal agencies that have influence or oversight 
in the operational and decommissioning processes for nuclear plants. 
Medium Priority, Long Term: Because the announcement of plant closure puts intense 
focus on the topics of safety and site reuse, Plymouth and the OCPC should address the 
socioeconomic impacts of power plant closure with relevant state agencies in the near 
future, well before any closure is on the horizon. Dialogue with MEMA and the 
Department of Public Health will clarify which state agencies are likely to be a part of the 
decommissioning process, and provide an opportunity to develop a relationship around 
plant closure instead of decommissioning.  
5.3 Building Momentum 
Work with state legislators and policy makers to expand the shoulders of state and 
federal programs for energy transition planning and site redevelopment. 
Higher Priority, Near Term: Plymouth may wish to lead a coalition of communities most 
affected by Pilgrim Station’s closure to demonstrate the need for state-level initiatives 
similar to those established for coal plant closure. These closures have resulted in the 
establishment of task forces appointed by the governor and the disbursal of millions of 
dollars to compensate for the reduction of tax revenues. The initiatives responded to a 
challenging time for an energy industry, and given the recent concerns about nuclear 
power economics, it is an appropriate time for the state to consider the impacts of nuclear 
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plant closure. A similar process can also take place at the federal level, where the US 
Economic Development Administration (EDA) recently launched the Partnerships for 
Opportunity and Workforce and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative, a multi-
agency effort to provide support to communities affected by changes throughout the entire 
coal economy. 
Focus on developing local assets off-site, using regional and town planning initiatives to 
bring plant and state officials into the process. 
Medium Priority, Near Term: In the FY2015 Senate Appropriations Committee bill that 
established the EDA budget for the year, the Senate directed the EDA to investigate the 
impacts of nuclear power plant closure. As part of its Comprehensive Economic 
Development Strategy process (CEDS), the OCPC could incorporate plant closure 
preparations into its goals for the region, and begin working with other RPAs to take the 
first steps towards a joint application to the EDA for nuclear plant closure research. 
Locally, Plymouth may wish to build on the updated Manomet Village Center master plan 
and the Downtown Village Center master plan, to examine how the village goals identified 
in those documents may be affected by the closure of Pilgrim Station. 
Promote stability in Pilgrim Station-based revenue for municipalities receiving financial 
support from the plant.  
Medium Priority, Long Term: As the state enters into negotiations with Entergy when 
closure is announced, the OCPC may wish to have a plan in place for the eight communities 
that receive payments from Pilgrim Station. To ensure that the revenue is not reduced so 
quickly as to be destabilizing to the public, the OCPC could spearhead an initiative to 
combine modest municipal savings over the remaining operational life of the plant. At 
closure, each municipality’s final payment from Pilgrim Station would be spread out over 
two or three years, and supplemented with the community savings to ease transition. 
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Appendix A: Cleanup Standards 
While the NRC has jurisdiction over nuclear power plant decommissioning standards in 
general, two other federal agencies have jurisdiction over radioactive materials cleanup, 
as well. The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for cleaning up radiological 
contaminants on its own sites, which include former facilities engaged in materials 
processing and research and development, among others. The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has jurisdiction over those radiological sites that have been listed on the 
National Priorities List, as part of the Superfund program, with the exception of NRC-
regulated facilities. Unfortunately, the three agencies do not agree on a single cleanup 
standard, and it is the source of much inter-agency tension, as well as public confusion 
and frustration. 
In July of 1997, the NRC issued the “Radiological Criteria for License Termination,” which 
set the threshold for “how clean is clean enough” for reactor decommissioning. The ruling 
determined that a fully decommissioned power plant could expose an individual to no 
more than 25 millirem of radiation per year (mrem/yr), if it was to be released to 
unrestricted use. This represents an absolute cap for an annual dose. With that standard 
established, the NRC also relies on the ALARA process (As Low as Reasonable Achievable) 
to determine if the circumstances require more stringent cleanup, to levels below 25 
mrem. The NRC, however, is very comfortable with the established limit, and has yet to 
require a decommissioning facility to move below that level. 
Using similar methods, software, and protocols, the DOE also established a 25 mrem/yr 
dose as its general limit, but in March of 1997 it made a site-specific adjustment to 15 
mrem/yr at a site in California’s Santa Susana Field Laboratory. Since then, the DOE has 
stayed with the 15 mrem/yr level, and encouraged the NRC to do the same. The EPA, 
however, makes assessments based on lifetime risk, not dose. The EPA’s goal is to reduce 
the added risk of developing cancer based on exposure to site radioactivity to one in one 
million, with an upper limit of one in ten thousand. While the EPA has in the past viewed 
the risk associated with 15 mrem/yr to be an acceptable level, it has maintained that the 
dose-based approach taken by the NRC and the DOE is insufficient to ensure the 
protection of the public. Furthermore, it has (publicly) called for the NRC to ensure that 
the annual dose incorporated no more than 4 mrem/yr from groundwater radiation. 
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Unsurprisingly, the federal bickering led a number of states to conclude that they would 
be better off establishing their own regulations for radiation protection. The first to do so 
was Maine, which in April of 2000 imposed a 10 mrem/yr dose limit, with a separate 4 
mrem/yr dose standard for groundwater. At the time, Maine Yankee was in the process of 
decommissioning via immediate dismantlement. Officials from the plant estimated that 
the new regulations would add $25 million to $30 million to the total cost of 
decommissioning, although this total has not been confirmed. Three more states quickly 
followed suit. By December 2001, Massachusetts and New York had set standards of 10 
mrem/yr, and New Jersey was at the DOE-recommended level of 15 mrem/yr. Unless the 
regulatory criteria established by the Massachusetts State Department of Health change 
at some point, Pilgrim Station’s decommissioning will need to reach well below the NRC’s 
threshold of 25 mrem/yr before the property could be transferred, which could lead to the 
site sitting unused for years or decades beyond the 60-year decommissioning timeframe. 
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Appendix B: Spent Fuel Lawsuits 
In 1970, the Atomic Energy Commission (precursor to the NRC) established that the 
federal government would accept high-level waste generated by nuclear power plants for 
long-term storage, with the full costs borne by the plant operators. Until an appropriate 
site was made secure, operators were required to provide shorter-term storage at their 
own expense, by building and maintaining interim spent fuel storage installations 
(ISFSIs). A deadline for the long-term storage facility was established under the provisions 
of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, obligating the Department of Energy (DOE) to begin 
accepting and storing spent nuclear fuel by January 31, 1998. 
By that time, all three of the Yankee Companies were in the process of decommissioning 
their power plants: Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, and Maine Yankee. The companies 
filed lawsuits against the United States in 1998, alleging that the DOE breached its 
contracts with them under the terms of the 1982 Act. The government was found liable in 
2006, and in 2012 the three companies were awarded nearly $160 million in damages for 
spent fuel storage costs incurred between 1998 and 2002. These damages are referred to 
as Phase I litigation, as a court ruling in 2008 held that the companies must file lawsuits 
every several years to recover damages. Phase II litigation damages, covering 2003 to 
2008, awarded the Yankee Companies an additional $253.4 million, and Phase III 
damages for costs incurred from 2009 to 2012 are pending. Additional actions are likely 
to follow until the long-term storage issue is resolved. 
In the above case, the fact that the plants are no longer operational means that the total 
amount of spent fuel being stored is static. A more dynamic issue is before the 
Massachusetts Land Court, where plaintiffs have alleged that the permitted construction 
of an ISFSI at Pilgrim Station will diminish their property values. Since coming online in 
1972, Pilgrim Station’s spent fuel has been stored on-site in a water-filled pool, to keep the 
fuel rods cool as they undergo radioactive decay. With no off-site option available, the 
spent fuel pool reaching capacity, and the plant licensed to operate for 27 more years, 
Entergy must find another location on-site to accommodate additional spent fuel. 
In March 2013, Entergy received a permit from the Town of Plymouth’s Department of 
Inspection Services (DIS) for the construction of a concrete pad immediately northwest of 
the switchyard, to support an ISFSI. The DIS found that spent fuel storage was a “by right” 
accessory use at Pilgrim Station, and therefore did not require the issuance of a special 
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permit. This decision was challenged before the Plymouth Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), 
on the grounds that the town’s Zoning Bylaws require any facility zoned for Light Industry 
(such as Pilgrim Station) to obtain a special permit for any accessory uses, and do not allow 
spent fuel storage casks in such zones. The ZBA upheld Entergy’s permit, and 18 residents 
of Plymouth and Kingston appealed to the Land Court in August 2013. 
One year later, Entergy’s motion for summary judgment was allowed in part and denied 
in part, as eleven of the plaintiffs had been able to present evidence that the presence of 
the ISFSI would diminish their property values. The Court found that affidavits from 
Williams College Professor of Economics Dr. Stephen Sheppard and University of Chicago 
Professor Emeritus of Economics Dr. George S. Tolley had reached substantially different 
conclusions about the ISFSI’s impacts on the valuation of properties within two miles of 
the installation, demonstrating a significant issue of material fact. Pre-trial hearings are 
ongoing, and the trial is expected to begin in the fall of 2015. 
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Appendix C: Post Closure Community Snapshots  
The two community profiles that follow illustrate two very different experiences of nuclear 
power plant closure. The host sites share some remarkable similarities: both are small New 
England towns in rural or semi-rural settings, with a strong shipbuilding heritage. Both 
hosted low-output single-reactor nuclear power plants from about 1970 to 1996. Twenty 
years later, the outcomes indicate that neither town was sufficiently prepared for the 
closure of their respective plants.  
Despite their similarities, the towns treated their circumstances as host communities very 
differently. Wiscasset relied heavily on the plant to provide the revenue for school 
budgeting, capital improvement projects, and municipal investment. Haddam, on the 
other hand, relied on the plant primarily to keep taxes low for residents, and to fund the 
school district. Residents, protective of the town’s rural character and small town feel, 
were happy to keep development pressures out of Haddam. In both cases, the 
municipalities were leveraging the presence of the plant to accrue some civic benefit, and 
both attempted to meet challenges head on, through the proactive application of 
conventional economic development principles. 
Most interesting is the manner and outcome of the municipal interventions. In each case, 
the outcomes have not met expectations. Wiscasset used revenues from the plant to put 
extensive infrastructure in place during its operation. Once the plant closed, it struggled 
to keep up with maintenance costs. It partnered with non-profit and regional government 
groups to acquire former nuclear plant land, and worked to attract outside investment 
with condition-specific redevelopment expertise. The intent was to create a mixed-use 
village free from overreliance on a single taxpayer. The developers brought in by Wiscasset 
were not able to meet their tax obligations, and the development never got off the ground. 
A local non-profit acquired some of the land recently, removing some developable land 
from potential property tax rolls. Haddam, which had no compelling infrastructure 
outside of the nuclear power plant, quickly looked to reuse the plant for another energy 
production concern, as a smaller (but not insignificant) anchor. With the tax base 
stabilized, the town could begin investing in the kinds of capital improvement projects 
they had passed on while the plant was operational. Hopes for a gas-fired electricity plant 
never materialized, and the site has found no productive reuse. Instead, residential 
development has increased in the past decade, and Haddam is still without some of the 
infrastructure that a town looking to expand its commercial/industrial base needs. 
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The towns described here reacted in timely, productive, and sensible ways. They used the 
only tools available to municipalities to plan for hosting a nuclear power plant, make best 
economic use of its presence, and recover from economic impacts of its closing. This 
emphasizes the complexity of a host community’s challenges when a nuclear power plant 
shuts down permanently, and enters decommissioning. Events move very quickly, options 
can seem limited, and social, financial, and civic vulnerabilities can be exposed.  
C.1 Wiscasset and Maine Yankee 
Wiscasset is a small town of 3,700 residents in Maine’s Mid-Coastal region, 45 miles 
northeast of Portland and 24 miles south of Augusta. The town’s center lies on the western 
bank of the tidal Sheepscot River, which flows into the Gulf of Maine at Sheepscot Bay. 
Wiscasset’s downtown is bisected by U.S. Route 1, a major state highway serving Maine’s 
coastal cities and towns. Wiscasset’s prosperity as a colonial and early American hub for 
shipbuilding, seafaring, fishing, ice harvesting, and the timber trade left a number of 
historic homes in and around the town center. For well over a century, this era was 
Wiscasset’s economic high-water mark. 
In 1966, a number of electric utilities serving consumers in all six New England states 
formed the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company. The company received a construction 
permit in October of 1968 to build a nuclear power plant on 820 acres of land south of Old 
Ferry Road, on a peninsula near Bailey Point. The 860 MW pressurized water reactor 
began commercial operations at Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant in late December of 
1972. When Maine Yankee was powered down on December 6, 1996, it was expected that 
the plant would reopen in August of 1997. During the closure, fuel rods would be replaced, 
cables would be repaired, and steam generators would be inspected. When the plant’s 
Board of Directors announced in May that it was considering closing the plant 
permanently, it came as a surprise to employees, contractors, residents, and the town. 
August did not bring about the resumption of activities at Maine Yankee; instead, on 
August 6th the board voted to permanently cease operations, and start the 
decommissioning process (EPRI 2005). The plant had been operational for nearly 25 
years, and it had been the town’s primary source of revenue the entire time. 
Workforce and Population 
Prior to shutdown, Maine Yankee’s total payroll reached approximately $30 million, with 
476 full-time positions and 200 permanent contractor positions, and an average salary of 
 68 
 
$54,000 (JSC 1998). The greatest concentration of employees lived in the 20 miles 
between Wiscasset and Brunswick, most additional staff within an hour’s drive. In order 
to manage the transition, Maine Yankee offered staff a severance and early retirement 
program, awarding staff who remained on the project until their termination two weeks of 
pay for every year of service to the plant (EPRI 2005). By the end of 1997, four months 
after the plant’s closure was announced, the workforce was reduced to 317 (JSC 1998). The 
contractors soon outnumbered the staff, and by 2002 the plant contained approximately 
115 employees and 300 contractors (Shadis 2002). After the spent fuel was transferred 
into dry storage, employment decreased as buildings were demolished. The handful of 
staff (excluding security) at Maine Yankee is now about two dozen, which will maintain 
the radioactive waste casks on site until federal issues pertaining to off-site storage are 
resolved. 
Maine Yankee’s lifespan paralleled a major period of demographic growth in Wiscasset 
and Lincoln County. Wiscasset’s population grew by 61 percent between 1970 and 2000, 
from 2,244 to 3,603. Lincoln County’s growth in that time slightly outpaced the town’s, 
with a 64 percent change, from 25,692 to 33,616. Both town and county were significantly 
ahead of the Maine’s 29 percent population increase in that time (WCPC 2006). Since the 
plant’s closure, however, the story has shifted. The town grew by just 3.4 percent between 
2000 and 2010, to 3,732. This is the lowest rate of decennial growth in Wiscasset since the 
town’s population reached its nadir in 1930. County growth slowed as well, increasing by 
just 2.5 percent, to 34,457, the lowest rate of decennial growth since the 1950-1960 decade. 
Meanwhile, state growth outpaced both, rising by 4.2 percent. While modest, this rate 
outpaced the previous decade’s growth (US Census 2010). 
Municipal Impacts, Short-Term 
The town prospered during the Maine Yankee years, as the plant’s tax revenue covered 
well over 90 percent of the town’s budget. Wiscasset provided sewer and utility services to 
the most rural parts of town at no cost to residents, upgraded the wastewater treatment 
plant, and expanded cable television availability (Abel 2013). In that time, the town 
furnished the Fire Department with seven new fire trucks, the Highway Department with 
six new trucks and plows, and established an emergency services office, with two 
ambulances. The town built a large community recreation center with an indoor pool and 
fitness center, and constructed three piers along the river’s estuary for recreation and 
commercial activity (WCPC 2006). The school system admitted students from 
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neighboring towns for half the allowable cost, and was still able to maintain and upgrade 
facilities, provide students with field trips, and offer health benefits to staff. At the time of 
the plant’s closing, the town had no debt and a capital reserve of approximately $13 million 
(JSC 1998). 
The financial impact of Maine Yankee’s closure was severe and immediate. In 1996, the 
total property tax collected in Wiscasset was approximately $13.8 million, and $12.8 
million of it was paid by Maine Yankee (JSC 1998). In 1998, after the shutdown, the plant’s 
contribution had diminished by more than half, to approximately $5.8 million (Shadis 
2002), and the town’s total property tax revenue dropped to $8.4 million (WCPC 2006). 
Although it was impossible to make up the difference entirely, residents and business 
owners had to dig deeper into their pockets: non-Maine Yankee property tax contributions 
more than doubled, from $1 million in 1996 to $2.6 million in 1998. The increase was 
related to utility, school system, public works, and parks and recreation fees that were 
increased to offset the revenue loss. Neighboring towns sending students to Wiscasset 
schools saw their bills increase, as well, reaching the maximum cost allowed by the state 
in 2001 (JSC 1998). School spending decreased, however, as textbooks were updated less 
frequently, sports programs were abandoned, and teachers were required to take spousal 
health insurance, if available (Abel 2013). 
Municipal Intervention 
Although Wiscasset’s 1989 Comprehensive Plan had explored the value of broadening the 
local tax base, the town was not prepared for the sudden shift. In fact, it was not until 
August of 2000 that the town hired a consultant to provide an economic development 
strategy for the post-Maine Yankee years. The Business Plan for Economic Development, 
2000 was intended as a first step towards Wiscasset’s economic stabilization and growth. 
One of the plan’s recommendations was the formation of a public-private partnership to 
attract outside investment, and in 2002, the Wiscasset Regional Development 
Corporation (WRDC) was established to facilitate that investment at Maine Yankee. That 
same year, the Waterfront Master Advisory Committee completed the Waterfront Master 
Plan, 2002, and in 2003, Wiscasset established a town Office of Economic and Community 
Development (WCPC 2006). In October 2006, nearly ten years after Maine Yankee 
powered down for the final time, Wiscasset completed the Comprehensive Plan for the 
Town of Wiscasset, 2006, reviewing and revising the town’s goals, policies, and strategies 
in light of the town’s recent challenges. 
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As a development corporation, the WRDC brought together the Town of Wiscasset, 
Lincoln County, and two local non-profit organizations: the Chewonki Foundation, and 
Coastal Enterprises, Incorporated (CEI). Established in 1915, the Chewonki Foundation is 
an environmental education organization in Wiscasset that operates a number of summer 
camps, semester-long academic programs, and outdoor workshops and overnight 
camping trips. CEI, established in 1977, is a community development organization with a 
long history of securing grant funding from state and federal agencies for housing and 
economic development initiatives. 
The WRDC successfully secured a federal grant of $1 million to staff their Maine Yankee 
redevelopment efforts. Encouraged by the WRDC’s progress, voters in late 2003 
authorized the Town of Wiscasset to spend approximately $2.6 million of bond funding to 
purchase 431 acres of Maine Yankee property, known as the “Backlands” (WCPC 2006). 
The bond principal was loaned to a development corporation, which purchased the 
property to develop an industrial park on a portion of the site. The same developer also 
took possession of a former generating plant, Mason Station, to develop a mixed-use 
marina on the waterfront (Moore 2004). Both projects ran into trouble within a few years. 
The Town foreclosed on the Backlands property in 2010, and has owned it since then. The 
Mason Station project had been in arrears since 2007, until the Town acquired the land 
on account of the unpaid taxes in 2012 (Wiscasset 2013). 
Wiscasset Today 
More than 15 years later, Wiscasset is still a community struggling with the legacy of a 
prosperous era cut short. Property taxes have risen several times over. One 50-acre parcel, 
taxed at $289 in 1996, was taxed at $5,000 in 2012 (Abel 2013). While total property 
values have grown, with a 2013 value of $541 million, it is worth noting that the total 
property tax paid was $6.95 million, much less than the 1996 amount (Wiscasset Assessor 
2013). One reason for this valuation increase is the growth of Wiscasset’s tax-exempt 
holdings. In 2004, the total exemptions accounted for 5.9 percent of the town’s $462.5 
million valuation. In 2013, that percentage quadrupled, to 23.8 percent (MVRSS 2013). 
Meanwhile, the value of tax-eligible parcels in Wiscasset has increased by a mere $2.3 
million since 2004. This sustained revenue limitation has taken a toll on the town, causing 
it to restructure its priorities. In late 2013, Wiscasset voters chose to withdraw from the 
school district, by a more than two-to-one margin. 
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C.2 Haddam and Connecticut Yankee 
Haddam is a small town of 8,346 residents in central Middlesex County, Connecticut, 
approximately 12 miles upriver from the mouth of the Connecticut River. Straddling the 
river, it sits about 25 miles southeast of downtown Hartford, 30 miles northeast of 
downtown New Haven, and adjacent to the mid-sized city of Middletown. A natural cove 
at Higganum Landing, on the western shore, provided a port for much of the river activity 
that drove the town’s early economy. Ample hydropower flowing down to the Connecticut 
from the steep hills on the western bank brought several mills to the town, as well, 
supporting the emerging villages of Higganum, Shailerville, and Tylerville. In the decades 
between the Revolution and the Civil War, Haddam was a center for shipbuilding and 
quarrying, before transitioning to a manufacturing economy in the latter half of the 19th 
century. The town’s population declined to approximately 1,750 in 1930, before picking up 
again in the decades that followed (Haddam Selectmen 1999). 
By 1960, Haddam’s population stood at 3,466. Although the town was not served by the 
interstate system, Haddam occupied the midpoint of a 29-mile stretch of State Route 9 
that connects Interstate 91 to Interstate 95. In 1965, the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power 
Company, a consortium of electric utilities serving customers in all six New England 
states, purchased 525 acres of land on Haddam Neck, where the Salmon River joins the 
Connecticut. Construction of a 619 MW pressurized water reactor was completed two 
years later, and the Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant (CY) began commercial 
operations on January 1, 1968. The plant operated on the eastern shore of the Connecticut 
for nearly 29 years, shutting down on December 4, 1996 (EPRI 2006). That year, 
Connecticut Yankee accounted for approximately 60 percent of the town’s Grand List 
(DeJesus 1995).  
Workforce and Population 
With a full-time workforce of approximately 550, Connecticut Yankee had for many years 
been the largest employer in a small town with limited commercial/industrial activity. The 
sudden closure of the plant at the end of 1996 affected the town’s employment levels 
significantly. According to the Haddam Plan of Conservation and Development: 2007 
Update, Haddam’s non-farm employment dropped from 1,710 in 1996 to 1,320 in 1997, a 
22.8 percent decrease (Haddam Planning 2008). No replacement industry was 
forthcoming: four years later, in 2001, the employment base stood at 1,400. By the fall of 
1999, the decommissioning contractor, Bechtel Power Corporation, assumed 
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responsibilities for structural demolition. Bechtel’s 465 contract employees far exceeded 
the 150 Connecticut Yankee employees still on site (CDAC 1999). The decommissioning 
was completed in 2007, and a small number of CY employees will remain until the 
resolution of federal issues regarding permanent off-site fuel storage. 
Haddam’s population growth has largely been consistent with county growth levels for 
much of the past 50 years, and both have outpaced statewide growth in that time. 
Haddam’s boom lasted from 1940 to 1980, as the population grew by more than 25 percent 
from one decade to the next. The population more than tripled in that time, from 2,069 in 
1940 to 6,383 in 1980. This was followed by a pronounced lull, as the town’s population 
grew by no more than 6 percent in each of the next two decades, bringing the 2000 total 
to 7,157. While growth had also slowed in that period for Middlesex County, the county’s 
growth averaged out to more than 10 percent in the same time period (Haddam Planning 
2008). According to the last US Census, however, Haddam has broken out of its slump. 
The town’s population grew by 16.6 percent between 2000 and 2010, far outpacing growth 
rates of 6.3 percent in Middlesex County, and 4.1 percent statewide. 
Municipal Impacts, Short-Term 
For Haddam, the most significant impact of Connecticut Yankee’s closure was the drop in 
the tax revenue generated by the plant’s value, which would cover the costs of road and 
bridge repair, and the town’s share of the regional school district budget (DeJesus 1995). 
Further compounding the issue was a legal dispute between the Town and CY pertaining 
to a town-wide real estate revaluation, completed in 1991. Real estate was revalued every 
ten years, while personal property and equipment (accounting for much of the plant’s 
value) was revalued annually. At the time, CY accounted for nearly half of Haddam’s 
assessed value, and residents were concerned that the plant’s share would drop to one-
third of the total, or less (Hamilton 1991).Town officials, plant officials, and property 
owners all expected the real estate values among Haddam’s homeowners to rise 
significantly as a result of the revaluation, while the plant’s value would remain fairly 
stable. 
Instead, the consultant hired by the town to perform the 1991 revaluation increased the 
plant’s share of the tax base, to 57 percent. Although real estate values had risen drastically 
for residents, the plant’s value had increased to $840 million. The plant sought relief in 
the courts for the assessment, for the years 1991 to 1994. In September of 1996, just three 
months before the plant announced its permanent shutdown, the state Superior Court 
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ruled that the fair market value of the plant was $235 million (Marteka 1997). As a result, 
the town used most of its surplus to pay CY $4.6 million in early 1997, and bonded the 
remaining $10,000,000 in back taxes owed to the plant (NEAC 1999). The timing could 
hardly have been worse. In addition to owing the plant a significant sum of money, 
Haddam’s grand list contracted sharply, from nearly $1 billion in 1995 to $565 million in 
1997. Haddam was forced to face the uncertainty of a major economic transition with fairly 
empty pockets, new bond debt, and reduced revenue options. 
Haddam’s time as a nuclear power plant host community was not marked by extensive 
public building or infrastructure development. Speaking at the American Nuclear Society’s 
Annual Meeting in 1998, Connecticut State Representative Terry Concannon recalled 
serving as chair of Haddam’s newly-created Long-Range Capital Planning Committee, in 
1988. At several public meetings, she encouraged residents to take advantage of the town’s 
major economic engine: “to support the funding of needed projects, such as a fire house, 
town garage, playing fields, road improvements, and so on… there was much to be done 
before 2007,” in reference to the plant’s expected timeline (NEAC 1999). Instead, the town 
took a different approach: preserving the status quo. According to a 1996 article in The 
Hartford Courant, “Haddam remained unchanged, for the most part, with its own small 
country store, postcard-perfect homes, and rural landscapes” (DeJesus 1996). Haddam’s 
property taxes remained very low throughout the Connecticut Yankee years, but did not 
yield any amenities, like sidewalks, or key infrastructural pieces, like public water and 
sewer systems (Haddam Planning 2008). 
Municipal Intervention 
In 1995, Haddam created an Economic Development Commission, to address the town’s 
need for a diversified tax base and commercial composition (MBIA 2000). That year, the 
commission secured a state grant to hire an architect and a consultant to evaluate village-
centered options for diversifying the tax base (DeJesus 1995). With twelve years remaining 
on Connecticut Yankee’s initial operating license, the decision seemed like a prudent 
example of long-term thinking. By the end of 1996, however, the plant had been shut 
down, and the town was in a precarious position. 
The Economic Development Administration awarded the Town of Haddam an Economic 
Adjustment Assistance Grant in the fall of 1997. The grant’s purpose was to help the town 
develop an economic strategy addressing the impacts of the plant’s closure. In May of 
2000, an economic development firm retained with the grant funding presented the 
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Economic Summary Report: Town of Haddam to the town. The report proposed an 
economic development plan that included a number of best practices: regional tourism, 
retail, lodging, incubator space, home business, industrial parks, and office space (MBIA 
2000). Notably, the plan proposed spending between $4.5 and $5.9 million to provide 
public water service to two villages. The plan also suggested that the town encourage the 
construction of a 750 MW gas-fired electric generator on an existing parking lot at the 
Connecticut Yankee site, taking advantage of the site’s proximity to water and 
transmission lines. This option had been discussed in general for CY in the past (Hamilton 
1991), and had recently returned in a concrete proposal from an outside entity. 
In November of 1998, the nearby town of Southington rejected a proposal by AES 
Corporation, a Virginia-based energy company, to build a 720 MW gas-fired plant in town. 
After the defeat, and shortly before the Economic Summary Report was released, AES 
expressed interest in acquiring 20 acres of CY land in Haddam, to build a 750-megawatt 
gas-fired plant (Libow 2000a). The town hired a consulting firm to assist in evaluating the 
AES site proposal, which envisioned a $310 million project that would add as much as 
$200 million to Haddam’s tax base, and negotiated a potential tax abatement plan with 
the company (Libow 2000b). In early 2001, the project took another step forward, as AES 
and Connecticut Yankee signed an initial agreement for a land sale (CYAPC 2001). By 
March of the next year, however, the proposal was abandoned, with AES citing security, 
economic, and supply issues (Libow 2002). 
Haddam Today 
Since the gas plant proposal fell through, there have been very few concrete proposals for 
the reuse of CY land. In 2008, Connecticut Yankee hired a redevelopment consultant to 
advertise 500 acres of the site for reuse, in order to solicit expressions of interest from 
developers with requisite experience (Overton 2008). Since then, the only change has been 
the 2013 sale of 38 acres along the Salmon River to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(Marteka 2013). CY continues to be the town’s largest single taxpayer, with an assessed 
value that hovers near $40 million. In 2012, CY paid about $1.2 million in property taxes, 
or 4.5 percent of the town’s $26.6 million budget. Property sales and homebuilding have 
increased Haddam’s population density and housing tax base, but at the expense of the 
rural character that Connecticut Yankee once supported. 
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